Canada’s Arctic Reckoning Under Trump’s Monroe Doctrine

From Buffer to Front Line

BY RICHARD NGHIEM

The return of Donald Trump to the U.S. Presidency has accelerated a profound shift in American foreign policy that Canada must treat as structural rather than episodic. The current U.S. National Defense Strategy and accompanying policy signals reflect a decisive abandonment of post–Cold War liberal internationalism in favor of a hard-edged, sovereignty-centric, and regionally hierarchical worldview. At its core lies a revived and operationalized interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine—no longer framed as a diplomatic principle, but as an enforceable doctrine backed by credible military power. For those who may not be aware, the Monroe Doctrine a principle of U.S. policy, originated by President James Monroe in 1823, that views any intervention by external powers in the politics of the Americas as a hostile act against the U.S.

This evolution has already moved beyond rhetoric into practice. The 2026 U.S. intervention in Venezuela illustrates this change starkly: the United States demonstrated its willingness to unilaterally reshape political outcomes within the Western Hemisphere when it judges its interests or regional stability to be at risk. For Canada, the lesson is not Venezuela itself, but the precedent it establishes for hemispheric enforcement and strategic hierarchy.

Taken together, these developments have direct and unavoidable implications for Canada’s strategic environment. Under the revived Monroe Doctrine, the United States is no longer content with excluding external powers from the hemisphere; it seeks to actively shape political and security outcomes within it. In this framework, sovereignty is increasingly defined by capability rather than by legal status alone. States that cannot demonstrate the ability to secure their territory, approaches, and critical infrastructure risk becoming objects rather than subjects of strategic decision-making. For Canada—whose geography places it at the center of North American defence—this dynamic is most acute in the Arctic and the North Atlantic, particularly in relation to Greenland.

THE STRUCTURAL SHIFT IN U.S. STRATEGY

To understand how this shift affects Canada, it is necessary to situate it within the broader transformation of U.S. grand strategy. Under the current Trump administration, American strategic thinking increasingly divides the world into zones of vital interest, contested spaces, and peripheral theatres. Within this hierarchy, the Western Hemisphere—especially North America and its maritime and Arctic approaches—has been elevated to a non-negotiable core security zone. Inside this zone, Washington now expects not merely political alignment, but tangible military contribution from allies. Burden sharing, in this context, is no longer an abstract alliance principle; it has become a prerequisite for influence.

This expectation reflects a deeper reorientation in American priorities. Rather than emphasizing expeditionary stabilization missions abroad, the United States is refocusing on homeland protection, early warning, and forward defence of the continental United States. For allies, the implications are stark: those who contribute directly to homeland defence are treated as partners in strategic decision-making, while those who do not, risk marginalization. Once again, the Venezuelan intervention underscores this logic, demonstrating Washington’s willingness to act decisively and unilaterally when it perceives instability or vulnerability within its strategic perimeter.

Against this backdrop, Canada’s traditional strategic posture appears increasingly misaligned with U.S. expectations. For decades, Canada benefited from American tolerance of capability gaps north of the 49th parallel, justified by alliance solidarity and geographic inevitability. That tolerance, however, is eroding. The United States now increasingly views the Arctic not as Canada’s sovereign space first and foremost, but as North America’s most exposed avenue of approach. In this environment, Canada’s relevance is measured less by rhetorical commitment than by its concrete contribution to continental resilience.

CONTINENTAL SECURITY

It is within this shifting strategic hierarchy that the Arctic has assumed renewed centrality. Once treated as a peripheral concern, the region has become the focal point of continental defence planning. Climate change, technological advances, and renewed great-power competition have converged to transform the Arctic into a corridor for long-range strike systems rather than a passive buffer. Russian and Chinese investments in bombers, cruise missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and undersea platforms are explicitly designed to exploit polar trajectories that minimize warning time and complicate interception.

From a U.S. perspective, these developments have elevated the Arctic to the most likely vector for a strategic attack on North America. As a result, early warning, tracking, and interception capabilities in the High North have become central to U.S. homeland defence. This reality places Canada at the center of continental strategy whether it chooses that role or not. Operationally and strategically, the Arctic is no longer a buffer zone; it is the front line.

EARLY WARNING

With Canada’s contribution to continental deterrence being increasingly measured by how early it can detect threats, not merely how it can respond, the construction and deployment of the Defence Enhanced Surveillance from Space Project (DESSP) satellite constellation must be expedited as soon as possible. It is critical to establishing persistent, all-domain early warning and tracking across the Arctic, as geography and harsh environmental conditions continue to constrain the effectiveness of ground-based sensors in the region. DESSP is designed to provide continuous space-based detection of ballistic missile launches, emerging hypersonic and glide vehicle threats, and other high-velocity objects using infrared and multi-spectral sensing. This enables the earliest possible indication of an attack, regardless of launch location or trajectory.

That said, space-based surveillance alone is insufficient to ensure comprehensive Arctic domain awareness. To achieve continuous and resilient coverage, it must be complemented by ground-based radar systems that add depth and persistence. Together, these capabilities provide the strategic depth required to transform the Arctic from a blind approach corridor into a monitored battlespace. JORN-style high-frequency Over-The-Horizon Radar (OTHR) systems, for example, can routinely detect large airborne targets at ranges exceeding 3,000 kilometers, depending on ionospheric conditions. This allows bomber formations, maritime patrol aircraft, and surface vessels to be detected long before they approach North American airspace. Ultimately, while OTHRs do not provide fire-control quality tracking, their strength lies in strategic cueing. They alert commanders that a threat exists, identify its point of origin, and indicate its general vector of movement. DESSP sensors can then refine this information through persistent overhead tracking, supporting threat characterization, decision advantage, and layered missile defence.

READ: Canada Signs $2.5B Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar Deal with Australia

From this wide-area surveillance layer, Canada must also transition seamlessly into more precise tracking systems. At this intermediate tier, the AN/TPS-80 Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) plays a critical role. G/ATOR, which is produced by Northrop Grumman, is a multi-mission active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar capable of air surveillance out to approximately 470 km against conventional aircraft, with robust performance against low-altitude and low-observable targets. While often described as an expeditionary system, its mobility and modularity make it particularly well suited for Arctic forward operating locations, where infrastructure is limited and redundancy is essential.

By operating G/ATOR radars at key northern airfields and sensor nodes, Canada can provide track continuity between OTHR cueing and high-end discrimination sensors. G/ATOR’s ability to simultaneously support air surveillance, air traffic control, and counter-threat functions enhances resilience and reduces the number of specialized systems required in austere environments. Importantly, when networked through NORAD command-and-control architectures, G/ATOR feeds contribute to a shared recognized air picture rather than remaining nationally siloed.

Having said that, when talking about the significance of Arctic security and continental defence, it is impossible to avoid the topic of Greenland. Situated at the nexus of North American and European transit routes and astride the GIUK (Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom) gap, Greenland provides essential vantage points for early warning, missile tracking, and maritime domain awareness. Ottawa, as a result, can no longer treat Greenlandic security as a distant Danish responsibility, as protecting Greenland is inseparable from securing Canada’s eastern Arctic and North Atlantic approaches. Proactive military contributions—including radar deployment, sensor integration, and coordinated NORAD operations—, in other words, must be implemented as soon as possible to transform Greenland into a forward operating node that directly supports early warning, missile defence, and allied operational planning.

Consequently, with advanced sensing capabilities being extremely vital, it is imperative that Long-Range Discrimination Radars (LRDR) are procured and deployed both in Canada’s Far North as well as Greenland. Unlike early warning radars optimized merely to detect objects, LRDR is designed to resolve fine detail at extreme ranges—on the order of thousands of km—allowing it to distinguish between warheads, decoys, debris, and countermeasures during the midcourse phase of ballistic missile flight. This discrimination capability is indispensable for missile defence, as it determines whether interceptors are launched at correct targets.

For Canada, participation in LRDR-class capability—either through procurement, hosting, or data-sharing agreements—represents a qualitative shift in strategic relevance. Rather than simply reporting tracks, Canada would be contributing to engagement decision superiority, directly influencing interceptor allocation and engagement timelines. Integrated through NORAD, LRDR data would fuse with space-based sensors, airborne platforms, and allied radars, reinforcing Canada’s position as a critical node in continental early warning rather than a passive geography.

FROM DETECTION TO DECISION

That said, while sensing capabilities are undisputedly important, effective deterrence depends on the ability to translate detection into actionable understanding. In modern air and missile defence, this function increasingly resides in airborne platforms that bridge gaps between space, ground, and naval systems. It is within this operational context that the procurement choice between the F-35 and alternatives such as the Gripen becomes strategically decisive.

At a technical level, the F-35’s defining feature is not stealth alone, but sensor fusion. Its AESA radar, distributed aperture infrared system, electronic support measures, and passive detection capabilities are integrated onboard into a single fused picture without reliance on external processing. This allows the aircraft to act as a self-contained intelligence node, capable of detecting, classifying, and prioritizing threats while simultaneously sharing that information across the Joint Force. By contrast, the Gripen—while agile, cost-efficient, and effective in national air policing roles—relies far more heavily on off-board fusion and ground-based command systems to assemble a complete operational picture. In the Arctic, where sensor coverage is sparse and communications can be degraded, the F-35’s ability to operate independently at extended range while still contributing to the broader network becomes decisive.

In missile-defence scenarios, F-35s can detect airborne launch platforms, track cruise missiles at extended ranges using passive sensors, and relay precise targeting data to ground- or sea-based interceptors. This capability effectively extends the engagement envelope of systems such as Aegis Ashore and SM-6–equipped ships. In this role, the F-35 is less an interceptor and more a forward sensor and battle manager, enhancing the effectiveness of every other defensive layer.

Building on the F-35’s role as a forward sensor and battle manager, Canada’s airborne ISR and command-and-control capability can be further enhanced through the procurement of Saab’s GlobalEye early-warning aircraft. Unlike fighter platforms optimized for multi-role operations, GlobalEye is designed for persistent, high-altitude surveillance, combining a long-range AESA radar, advanced sensor fusion, and multi-domain awareness on a high-endurance Bombardier Global 6500 airframe. Its radar can detect airborne and maritime targets at ranges exceeding 400–450 km, including low-observable aircraft, cruise missiles, and surface vessels operating in Arctic or North Atlantic corridors. By acting as a mobile command-and-control node, GlobalEye fuses and disseminates data from F-35s, G/ATOR radars, LRDR-class systems, and space-based ISR, providing decision-makers and allied partners with real-time situational awareness. In the Arctic context, where fixed infrastructure is sparse and environmental conditions are challenging, the GlobalEye’s mobility and endurance would extend early warning coverage, improve response timelines, and strengthen the effectiveness of Canada’s layered missile-defence posture.

Building beyond this approach to crewed platforms and addressing the demands of sustained operations over vast distances, the unmanned AEW MQ-9 platform, which is being co-developed by General Atomics (GA-ASI) and Saab, could add another complementary layer of persistent surveillance. These drones field advanced radar and ISR payloads and are capable of remaining on station for 30+ hours. While not a replacement for crewed AEW aircraft such as GlobalEye, unmanned AEW MQ-9s offer continuous coverage over remote regions, acting as gap-fillers and force multipliers. In the Arctic, such platforms could loiter over maritime choke points, forward approaches, or radar gaps, feeding real-time data into NORAD networks. Their contribution to missile defence lies in early detection and track refinement, particularly against cruise missiles and low-altitude threats that challenge space-based sensors. By integrating unmanned AEW feeds with F-35 and GlobalEye data, Canada can build a resilient, layered sensing architecture that degrades gracefully under stress rather than collapsing.

MISSILE DEFENCE AS A CONTINUUM

Following detection and airborne command-and-control, the logical next layer in Canada’s Arctic and North Atlantic posture is engagement and interception. Missile defence is best understood as a continuum, where layered systems interact to address threats across different phases of flight—from launch, to midcourse, to terminal interception. Integration between sensors and shooters is critical, as advanced radar feeds and airborne data only translate into actionable defence if interceptors are networked, cued, and positioned effectively.

Accordingly, Aegis Ashore installations in the Far North must occupy the forefront of Canada’s layered missile-defence architecture, providing persistent, land-based engagement capability against ballistic and cruise missile threats. By employing SM-3 interceptors for exoatmospheric engagements and SM-6 missiles for flexible midcourse and terminal coverage, these sites create stable, continuously manned nodes capable of responding immediately to threats detected by their AN/SPY-6 radars in addition to other dispersed sensors such as LRDRs, G/ATOR radars, and airborne ISR platforms. Ultimately, as a fixed, high-capacity installation, Aegis Ashore ensures that Canada maintains credible defensive coverage even in austere Arctic regions, forming the backbone of both national and allied missile-defence networks.

Following this initial BMD layer, the deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) systems would further complement midcourse interceptors by engaging ballistic missiles descending toward defended assets. THAAD batteries are capable of interceptions both inside and outside the atmosphere, with ranges exceeding 200 km. In the context of continental defence, these systems could be stationed in Greenland and Southern Canada to protect critical radar installations, air bases, population centers, and infrastructure, including ports and key communications nodes. By integrating THAAD sensors with data from F-35s, GlobalEye, MQ-9 AEW drones, G/ATOR radars, and LRDR-class systems, THAAD interceptors are cued with highly accurate targeting data, shortening reaction times and maximizing probability of kill.

Lastly, but equally important, the procurement of three additional specialized air-defence River-class destroyers would be highly advantageous. By removing their special mission bays to add 64 additional VLS cells, these vessels could carry a substantial mix of SM-3 and SM-6 missiles, along with 16 Naval Strike Missiles (NSMs) for surface strike and deterrence. Positioned in the North Atlantic or Arctic approaches, these ships would provide mobile midcourse and terminal ballistic missile defence, enforce sea control, and contribute to allied deterrence. Their integration with airborne sensors and Aegis Ashore installations ensures that threat detection translates rapidly into intercept opportunities, while their mobility allows Canada to adapt coverage dynamically to emerging threats.

Taken together, this layered architecture—Aegis Ashore as the first line, THAAD for terminal defence, and River-class destroyers providing mobile coverage—creates a resilient continuum from detection to engagement. By networking these assets with airborne command-and-control platforms like the F-35, GlobalEye, and MQ-9 AEW drones, and ground/space-based sensors including G/ATORs, LRDRs, and DESSP early warning satellites, Canada can generate redundant, overlapping kill chains that maintain effectiveness even if individual nodes are degraded. This approach ensures that both population centers and strategic infrastructure are defended, while also enhancing deterrence by signalling credible response capability to potential adversaries.

EXERCISES, ALLIANCES
& INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRATION

Having said that, Canada’s Arctic posture must also be reinforced through coordinated exercises, institutionalized alliances, and formalized operational frameworks. BMD capability alone is insufficient in a region as vast, austere, and strategically complex as the Arctic–North Atlantic interface. Instead, credible deterrence relies on the seamless integration of sensors, shooters, and personnel across national boundaries, ensuring that systems operate coherently under high-tempo, real-world conditions. Strengthening interoperability and readiness in this way complements the missile-defence and ISR layers already in place, translating technical capacity into operational effectiveness.

In the air domain, allied integration can be made concrete through a more ambitious and regularized program of joint patrols and exercises focused on the Arctic–North Atlantic seam. This would involve Canadian CF-18s (and eventually CF-35s), Danish F-35s, and U.S. assets operating out of Greenland’s airfields such as Thule/Pituffik and forward operating locations in Iceland and northern Canada. ISR capabilities are central in this domain, with Greenland-based radar, space-based ISR, and Canadian Arctic sensor data fused into a shared command-and-control architecture. Scenarios would emphasize long-range intercepts, bomber escort missions, air-to-air refueling in austere conditions, and coordinated responses to unidentified aircraft transiting the GIUK gap, while stress-testing ISR fusion and early warning timelines. By regularly exercising the integration of airborne, space-based, and ground ISR, partners reinforce deterrence and demonstrate seamless cross-Atlantic air defence coverage.

Building on this, naval cooperation also provides a complementary layer of Arctic and North Atlantic security. Canada’s Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) and future multi-mission corvettes, along with Danish Arctic-capable vessels and allied submarines, could conduct recurring trilateral exercises centered on anti-submarine warfare, maritime domain awareness, and sea-line protection. These exercises simulate adversary submarine transits through the GIUK Gap, gray-zone activity around undersea cables and energy infrastructure, and coordinated surface patrols in ice-affected waters.

Sustaining this tempo of complex, multinational operations—particularly in ice-affected and high-latitude environments—however, requires infrastructure that can support forward presence, logistics, and maintenance at scale. A new deep-water port in southern Greenland, capable of hosting River-class destroyers and allied submarines, therefore should be constructed to enable sustained high-end operations in the GIUK Gap. Complementing this, the permanent stationing of RCN submarines at the Nanisivik Naval Facility or, alternatively, CFB Iqaluit would provide the basing, logistics, and maintenance capacity necessary for continuous undersea sovereignty patrols across Canada’s northern maritime approaches.

CANADA MUST BE PROACTIVE

Taken together, the strategic logic is clear. In an era where the United States is reasserting hemispheric dominance and prioritizing homeland protection above all else, Canada’s security depends on being seen as an indispensable partner rather than a protected neighbor. The revived and operationalized Monroe Doctrine under the current U.S. administration signals that proximity alone is no longer sufficient to guarantee influence or deference. Instead, relevance is increasingly measured by capability, contribution, and willingness to shoulder responsibility in areas of direct strategic consequence to the United States—most notably continental defence and the Arctic–North Atlantic corridor.

The alternative—strategic complacency—carries significant risks. A failure to invest in credible Arctic defence, early warning, and missile interception capabilities would not simply create military vulnerabilities; it would erode Canada’s political leverage and strategic autonomy. In such a scenario, Canada risks becoming a passive security consumer in a region where others increasingly act as security providers. Venezuela’s fate is not Canada’s future, but the underlying lesson is universal: in a world of renewed great-power politics, sovereignty is secured not by geography or goodwill, but by capability, credibility, and contribution.

Canada’s response to the revived Monroe Doctrine must therefore be proactive rather than reactive. By strengthening Arctic and Greenland defence, investing in layered early warning and missile-defence architectures, and deepening operational integration with Denmark, Greenland, and key NATO partners, Canada can adapt to this transformed strategic environment while safeguarding its national interests. These measures position Canada not as a liability to be managed, but as a force multiplier within the broader North American and transatlantic defence posture.

Crucially, this approach does not undermine Canada’s relationship with the United States—it stabilizes it. By carrying a greater share of the burden for Arctic and continental defence, Canada reinforces NORAD, strengthens deterrence, and aligns its strategic priorities with those of its most important ally. In doing so, Canada helps ensure that cooperation is grounded in shared responsibility rather than asymmetric dependence, preserving both alliance cohesion and national autonomy in an increasingly contested and unforgiving international system.

Richard Nghiem is a Regular CDR Contributor