Defence Insider: Elevators, Saunas, and Macchiato Machines
BY VICE-ADMIRAL (RET’D) MARK NORMAN
As we face a second Trump presidency – with the backdrop of growing global security concerns, a looming domestic fiscal crisis and a likely change of government here in Canada – our focus needs to rapidly shift from rationalizing the WHAT and WHY of our defence spending problem, to HOW we are actually going to solve it.
The next government will face enormous external pressure, a fiscal capacity challenge, and a bow-wave of previous commitments and unaddressed spending requirements. Wholesale reviews of policy, processes and spending priorities will likely be the want of many in the machinery of government, but decisive action is required. Politicians, bureaucrats, military leaders, and Canadians at large are going to have to accept significant degrees of RISK if we have any hope of meeting our current obligations, let alone be ready for the likely increases of the spending targets that will come in the next few years.
THE ACCEPTANCE OF RISK
RISK, like art, is in the “eye of the beholder”. It is never homogenous and is instead directly linked to the differing perspectives of the multiple stakeholders in the process. The risk of a process failure is different than the risk of a legal challenge, a contractual error, a delivery delay, a down-stream technical issue, a performance shortfall, or a cost-overrun. This is one of the key reasons why previous attempts to “fix procurement” have failed. Ultimately, fiddling with processes has minimal impact when the actual foundational concerns of the different stakeholders are not properly addressed. Everyone involved has a responsibility that they think is more important than the responsibility or accountability of other stakeholders in the system. As a result, they will fight to defend their corner while trying to transfer their problems to someone else in pursuit of a perfect outcome. Until such time as those who actually own the risks – Ministers of the Crown and their most senior officials – openly declare and demonstrate a willingness to deliver imperfect outcomes – everyone else will just continue to pursue their parochial interests while obstructing progress. This open acceptance of RISK must be the cornerstone of any meaningful attempt to change HOW we behave.
There will be no “silver bullet”, or “one size fits all” solution to the problem. Of late, there has been a lot of focus on “Off the Shelf” solutions, including purchases by way of FMS or other mechanisms. These are, in my view, quick fixes to problems that we should have seen coming or that arise out of urgent operational necessity. The former is glaring evidence of a systemic failure; the latter a reality of modern military operations. They should not be treated the same way; and buying a “quick fix” to a problem that has been ignored for nearly 2 decades is hardly grounds for celebration.
Additionally, not everything we need exists elsewhere, and in many cases the “use cases” of other countries are sufficiently different to warrant a partially, if not fully, bespoke “Canadian” approach. Further, we need to move beyond the bias that doing/having more automatically means more of the same. There are many capabilities that are either specific to our own needs, or that can fill key gaps in the collective capabilities of allies. This – in my view – is an area of potential Canadian advantage*.
My experience with “Off the Shelf” solutions is that despite being advertised as such, they infrequently deliver the intended outcome. There is a time and place for this approach, but when used primarily to allay the concerns of decision-makers under the guise of simplicity and cost/schedule reductions, expectations often don’t match reality. Even with well-intended attempts to minimize changes or copy existing designs, problems are inevitable. Case in point are my experiences with the designs of both JSS and AOPS. The former represented as an “Off the Shelf” design; and the latter based on the integration of various elements of pre-existing designs.
FAUX-EXPEDIENCY
Beyond the extensive work required to finalize the designs of both classes of ship, there were a few arguably humorous and illustrative moments. As it related to AOPS, I was advised by a colleague elsewhere in government that the documentation being circulated had “cut and pasted” large elements of the specifications of a Danish ship that included the requirement for a “hot beverage dispenser” on the bridge capable of dispensing a bunch of fancy coffees including “macchiatos”. In the case of JSS, apparently the German navy believed that a sauna and an elevator to the bridge were operational necessities. None of these were Canadian requirements; we imagined the outrage if such “requirements” (not of our making) were publicized. Fortunately, these were extremely minor changes, the documents were amended, and to my knowledge these potential “crises” were averted. We can all imagine though how the risk-averse defence procurement ecosystem would have reacted to any/all of these glitches; imagine further if more significant elements of the design were either included or excluded in the interest of “faux-expediency”.
So, when we talk about doing things quicker and cheaper, I’m all for it. Let’s be careful however that we understand precisely what we really mean. There is no “risk-free” approach and we need to stop imagining or hoping that there is. Instead, we need to understand, and where necessary embrace, the risks that are necessary to do what is needed. If we can find a way to start with this, the rest should follow.
* ‘Canadian Advantage’ will be the topic of my next column!
VAdm (Ret’d) Mark Norman is a former Commander of the RCN and Senior Defence Strategist with Samuel Associates. The views expressed in this Defence Insider article are his own and do not necessarily reflect a CDR editorial position.
