Denmark’s decision to acquire the AGM-158B Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range for its F-35A fleet represents a significant enhancement of the Royal Danish Air Force’s long-range precision-strike capabilities and may provide an important model for Canada as Ottawa considers how to best maximize the combat potential of its own future F-35 force. That commitment was underscored by the U.S. State Department’s recent approval of a potential Foreign Military Sales package, worth approximately US$842 million, covering up to 203 AGM-158B JASSM-ER cruise missiles along with training variants, support equipment, software, logistics support, and related services. With this acquisition, Denmark joins a growing group of F-35 operators fielding a stealthy, long-range precision strike weapon capable of engaging heavily defended targets at distances well beyond the reach of most enemy air-defence systems

A Deteriorating Security Environment

For Copenhagen, the procurement reflects a transformed European security landscape. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, mounting concern over the military balance in the Baltic and Arctic regions has compelled NATO members to reconsider not just the size of their forces, but their reach and lethality. Through the JASSM-ER, Denmark’s F-35A fleet will gain the ability to hold high-value targets at risk without requiring aircraft to penetrate heavily defended airspace—a capability that provides both a powerful deterrent and a meaningful contribution to NATO’s collective strike options.

READ: Canada Secures Long-Range Missile Capability for CAF

The Missile: Capabilities and Design

Among the most capable air-launched cruise missiles currently in Western service, the JASSM-ER was developed by Lockheed Martin and combines a low-observable airframe with autonomous navigation systems, GPS guidance, and an imaging infrared seeker that enables terminal target identification even in contested electronic-warfare environments. It carries a 450-kilogram penetrator/blast-fragmentation warhead designed to defeat hardened targets such as command bunkers, air-defence nodes, and critical infrastructure.

In comparison with the baseline AGM-158 JASSM, which has a range of roughly 370 kilometres, the JASSM-ER extends strike reach to more than 900 kilometres and, according to some sources, beyond 965 kilometres. The missile can be integrated on numerous U.S. and allied aircraft, including the F-35A, F-15, F-16, B-1B, B-2, and B-52. With regards to Denmark, it intends to employ the weapon from its new F-35A fleet, giving the aircraft a true deep-strike capability against heavily defended targets. That pairing has already been tested under the most demanding operational conditions imaginable.

Combat Record: Operation Epic Fury

During the U.S.-led campaign against Iran, the JASSM-ER reportedly played a central role in long-range strike operations against military, strategic, and critical infrastructure targets across the country—cementing its status as one of the most heavily used Western precision-guided weapons in modern warfare. The scale of its employment was absolutely staggering. According to operational analyses of the campaign, approximately 135 JASSM and JASSM-ER missiles were launched during the first 96 hours of Operation Epic Fury alone. Beyond that initial salvo, more than 1,000 JASSM-ER missiles were expended during the first month of combat operations. These numbers, if accurate, mark one of the largest aerial bombardments, using modern long-range precision strike weapons, in history.

Throughout the campaign, the JASSM-ER was repeatedly deployed against high-value targets, including command-and-control facilities, military headquarters, missile infrastructure, hardened underground sites, and elements of Iran’s nuclear program. It proved especially effective against air-defence networks; coalition officials reported that by the end of March 2026, approximately 85 percent of Iran’s air-defence architecture had been neutralized. This sweeping degradation included the destruction of roughly 100 anti-aircraft missile batteries and 120 radar systems. By enabling tactical strike aircraft and strategic bombers to conduct stand-off attacks from well outside hostile engagement zones, the JASSM-ER allowed U.S. forces to strike heavily defended Iranian targets while minimizing aircrew exposure to hostile fire.

Industrial Strain and Stockpile Concerns

Beneath these operational successes, however, the sheer pace of JASSM-ER consumption during the Iran campaign exposed the difficulty of sustaining large-scale precision strike operations against a well-armed adversary. To maintain the relentless tempo required to systematically dismantle the IRGC’s deeply buried and heavily fortified strategic assets, the United States was forced to take drastic logistical measures. Reports indicate that the Pentagon rapidly depleted its domestic reserves and was compelled to draw missiles from stockpiles worldwide, including inventories previously allocated to the Indo-Pacific theatre. Several accounts claim that U.S. stockpiles fell from roughly 2,300 JASSM-ER missiles before the conflict to approximately 425 operational missiles remaining after extensive combat use and redeployments. At current production rates, replenishment of those munitions could take years. Having said that, concerns about this temporary capacity shortage are somewhat overblown as before Operation Epic Fury even started, the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin were already undertaking significant efforts to quickly ramp up production of the JASSM-ER.

Ramping Up Production

In March 2025, Lockheed Martin received a US$122.6 million contract for tooling and test equipment specifically intended to increase JASSM-ER production quantities. This investment was part of a broader multi-year effort to expand America’s manufacturing capacity and missile industrial base. In response, the company has since built a new 225,000-square-foot advanced manufacturing facility incorporating greater automation, robotic processes, and digital forecasting tools. Furthermore, through recent multi-year procurement contracts and large-lot purchases, Lockheed Martin can now acquire long-lead components earlier, improve production-line efficiency, and bolster output more rapidly in response to operational demand.

The scale of this expansion that started last year is absolutely overwhelming. Annual procurement has already reached approximately 550 JASSM-ER missiles per year, while the U.S. Air Force has increased its long-term stockpile objective by nearly 50 percent. At the same time, Lockheed Martin has reported combined production rates of roughly 720 JASSM and LRASM missiles annually and is working toward a capacity of approximately 1,100 missiles per year. The objective is not only to replenish weapons expended in recent conflicts, but also to ensure sufficient inventories for deterrence requirements in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. For allied nations watching these developments, the trajectory matters because the countries best positioned to benefit from this expansion are those that move early.

Implications for Canada

Among the allies with the most at stake is Canada, which is acquiring 88 F-35A fighters but currently lacks a comparable long-range air-launched cruise missile capability for its future fighter force. A Canadian purchase of JASSM-ER would significantly expand the strategic utility of the Royal Canadian Air Force, enabling long-range precision strikes across the Arctic, North Atlantic, and other theatres while reducing reliance on allied strike assets.

For Ottawa, that capability would be particularly relevant as Canada seeks to strengthen continental defence, contribute meaningfully to NATO deterrence, and respond to growing military competition in the Arctic. By equipping its F-35s with JASSM-ERs, Canada would gain a survivable conventional deterrent capable of holding adversary command centres, air-defence systems, logistics hubs, and critical military infrastructure at risk from considerable standoff distances.

The Timing Challenge

Pursuing that capability in the near term, however, would not be without friction. Given the extensive reported expenditure of JASSM-ER missiles during operations against Iran, combined with U.S. efforts to rebuild depleted inventories and maintain credible deterrence against China in the Indo-Pacific, foreign customers could face meaningful delivery delays. Washington is expected to prioritize replenishing its own stockpile before fulfilling allied orders, particularly as it eyes potential future contingencies involving peer competitors.

Reasons for Cautious Optimism

That said, the risk of prolonged delays may be less severe than it initially appears. The very investments described previously — in manufacturing capacity, automated processes, supplier expansion, and multi-year procurement agreements — are specifically intended to increase output and strengthen supply-chain resilience while simultaneously supporting allied foreign military sales programs. Over time, long-term contracts provide industry with greater confidence to invest in additional capacity and workforce expansion, suggesting that current shortages reflect a temporary dislocation rather than a structural ceiling.

The Broader Lesson

Beyond Denmark’s immediate acquisition, the decision underscores an increasingly clear trend among Western F-35 operators: the aircraft’s value is magnified when paired with long-range precision weapons. As European allies move to acquire advanced standoff strike capabilities, Canada risks becoming the exception among fifth-generation fighter operators—fielding a world-class platform without the weapons needed to exploit it fully.

For Ottawa, Denmark’s procurement offers a compelling example of how a relatively small air force can dramatically increase its deterrent power through a single, well-chosen capability investment. The production challenges that complicate near-term acquisition are real, but they are being actively addressed. In the end, the principal question for Canada may no longer be whether it needs a long-range standoff strike capability, but how soon it can position itself in the production queue for one.