Canadian Sovereignty is on Thin Ice
Editor’s Note:The following article was submitted by Dr. S. Mike Pavelec, Director of the Schriever Space Scholars at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Dr. Pevelec has taught at the U.S. Naval War College, the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), Air Command and Staff College, and the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS).
Climate Change and American unreliability are forcing Canada to explore new options for its strategy in the Far North and on the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Canadian sovereign territory is being challenged while the traditional and historic North American alliance system that Canada has come to depend on is unravelling. The following article provides a strategy to address these concerns and prioritize Canadian interests in the Far North.
The Northwest Passage – the sea route that traverses the Artic Ocean – is increasingly vital for commerce, security, and resources. The Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) fall well within Canadian sovereign territory, Canadian territorial waters (12 nautical miles), and part of the Canada’s Economic Exclusivity Zone (EEZ – 200 nautical miles) as defined by international law. From Baffin Island in the east to the Canada-Alaska (U.S.) border in the west, the 1,440 km sea route presents new opportunity. However, today, whereas Canada considers the Northwest Passage historic internal waters, the U.S. wants to classify the Northwest Passage as an international strait.
Previously, this was not a problem. But as of early 2025, two variables in conjunction force reconsideration of Canada’s role in the Northwest Passage. First, continuing and increasing Global Climate Change results in more days every year where the Northwest Passage is actually passable, either in open waters or with icebreaker ships early or late in the transit season. Second, notwithstanding the constant and historic security challenges from Russia and the PRC over the Arctic, the mercurial and toxic American administration is forcing Canada to reconsider its security situation in general, and in the Far North specifically. With overt threats of annexation (economic or military) of Greenland and Canada for “security” reasons, Canada must now consider these issues without a historic, traditional American partner, and possibly in contradiction to American wishes. This article outlines a strategy – including various lines of effort – to control the Northwest Passage and Far North for the future of Canadian National Security.
THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT
Long before the completion of the Panama Canal, a sea route between Europe and Asia was considered across the Arctic. With the completion of the Panama Canal, the Northwest Passage (Northern Sea Route: NSR) became less imperative because of the ravages of the northern climate including sea ice, extreme temperatures, wind, and snow. Today, Global Climate Change has brought the NSR back into focus for several competing States as an important commercial SLOC. The transit time is not only faster, but the costs (fees and fuel) are also lower, and the security considerations are also less concerning. Traditional shipping lanes from Asia to Europe transit the Panama Canal, with fees and security concerns associated with Panama. The other popular route is through the Suez Canal, which also incurs fees and presents other security risks. By comparison, the NSR is safe from political instability, pirates, and fee-free at least during the summer. It is still impassable (in 2025) in the winter months. Thus, China, with over 50% of the world’s shipping is interested in the route for commercial purposes, as are the European haulers MSC, Maersk, and CMA.
In addition to the pure economics of shipping, the NSR is an important area for untapped resources. The Trump administration is determined to drill for oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), continue to allow gold mining and begin exploration and exploitation of rare earth elements (REE) in Alaska. The White House is determined to tap into the resources in their EEZ and there is an increasing concern that they covet Canadian resources as well.
Which brings up the third strategic contextual component: security. With vast resources across a frozen wasteland, Canada has a vested interest in securing the northern border controlling the NSR for national security. In the latest Defence Policy Update, Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defense (2024), both the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs in their opening sentences emphasize national security and securing borders. The point is reiterated throughout the document.
The question of security arises when interlopers act on illegally extracting resources from Canadian sovereign territory or from the EEZ at the top of the world. Whether it is illegal fishing, or semi-permanent settlements to mine resources, Canada needs to be able to protect borders and internal waters from nefarious actors. Thus, the purpose of this argument; a proposal for Canada to control the NSR and Northern Shield in order to preserve national security and sovereignty. Even if Canada chooses to not tap into northern resources, it does not mean that any other country has any justifiable reasons to steal Canada’s resources. But it does mean that Canada will need to take a much more proactive stance in the far north.
LINES OF EFFORT (LOE) LAND
Canada must strengthen and maintain permanent presence on the ground in the Far North. Currently, Canada has already begun to implement ground presence in the Far North by bolstering bases and supplies in three places, Iqaluit, Inuvik, and Yellowknife. Under the new plan for Northern Operational Support Hubs, the Canadian Government announced funding of $2.67B CDN over 20 years to build up “airstrips, logistics facilities, and equipment that will enable the Canadian Armed Forces to better assert Canadian sovereignty and support greater year-round presence.” According to a government of Canada press-release from March 6th, “these hubs will function as a dispersed network of logistical stations, which will extend the Canadian Armed Forces’ operational reach, reduce logistical constraints, and enhance support for military operations in the Arctic.” While this is a good start, the territory in question includes hundreds of thousands of square kilometers and will be difficult to support given the distances and area involved.
Canada also has significant capabilities in arctic training. Recently, Canada has offered the U.S. training facilities and exercises for Far North operations. In the absence of Canada-U.S. cooperation, Canada has the opportunity to expand the list of allied forces for integrated northern (or extreme southern) operations by inviting a longer list of military forces to train in the Arctic. This is just one way to leverage Canadian expertise to expand the network of alliances and friendly relations in the new political climate.
One way to bolster the land component is to refine and erect an integrated network of Over-the-Horizon radar systems that make use of ionospheric scintillation to sense surface targets at distances of up to 200 nautical miles (370 km) such as the OTH-0100 radars currently in use in Brazil for the same purpose. In fact, Canada recently announced efforts to build and deploy these capabilities for this purpose, working with Australia to develop the capability. The radars will provide signals intelligence for the remote and dispersed Operational Support Hubs for rapid reaction forces, if necessary, to detect and intercept adversary surface, air, and missile incursions in Canada’s Far North.
READ: D-TA Systems Pitches Canadian Solution for Arctic Over-The-Horizon Radar Contract
AIR
The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) will play an invaluable role in monitoring the Far North as well. The three hubs mentioned above will be equipped with airfields for aerial operations that will bolster other RCAF airfields at Gander, Goose Bay, and Cold Lake (the closest to the Far North). CFB Cold Lake and Gander have wings of CF-18 air superiority fighters, and CFB Goose Bay stages search and rescue aircraft (fixed and rotary wing) as well as anti-submarine warfare platforms.
Canada should also consider cutting edge technology that can be produced in Canada for the same role. Canada is already investing in Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) technology and has the opportunity to expand domestic production of aerial and ground control systems. Both RPAS and autonomous aerial vehicles are evolving into reliable, long-range, and lengthy-loiter platforms that have the added bonus of not putting humans into harm’s way. Uncrewed aerial vehicles, remotely piloted or autonomous, can accomplish most of the same duties as crewed platforms at a lower cost. Further, Canada can expand an entire industry to fill domestic and foreign orders, starting with existing companies like Canadian UAVs and Bombardier, among others.
The air component of this strategy will have to be strengthened. Canada needs maritime patrol aircraft, potentially including the Boeing P-8A Poseidon. In lieu of the American aircraft, if friction continues with the Trump Administration, the Airbus C295 MPA/ASW or the Japanese Kawasaki P-1 Maritime Patrol aircraft are good substitutes. In addition to the fixed-wing aircraft, several rotary-wing options are available for shorter range duties. Currently Canada intends to buy sixteen Boeing P-8s, announced in November 2023, but in the changing political climate Canada should consider changing suppliers in case the U.S. decides to cancel the contract. The major assumption is that the 2023 decision will hold. However, current events lead to speculation that Canada may reconsider the Boeing option and refocus elsewhere. Evidence for this concept is the current review of the F-35 acquisition. Back in March, PM Carney asked for a review of Canada’s plan to purchase a fleet of F-35 fighter jets, as Canada has only legally committed to buying the first 16 aircraft. Some defence experts have suggested that Canada should cancel the rest of the F-35A procurement and reconsider the Saab Gripen, Eurofighter Typhoon, or the Dassault Rafale. During the latest NATO leaders’ summit in Brussels, PM Carney said that he expected the review to be completed “by the end of the summer.”
READ: Saab to Consider Canada for its Gripen Jet Assembly
Regardless of where the airframes originate, Canada must bolster its aerial surveillance capabilities for identification and monitoring of the NSR and Far North, employing munitions if necessary for national security and protection of sovereignty.
SEA
Ships on the sea and in the passage will be essential to the security and safety of the NSR. Although there are no significant port facilities along the route, Canada must have a surface fleet for monitoring, patrolling, and search and rescue. Beginning with efforts by PM Stephen Harper in 2006, the Canadian Government began efforts to expand deep-water port facilities at Iqaluit. Cost overruns and ongoing problems with materials in the extreme cold and ice have delayed progress on this and other Far North port facilities. However, the Justin Trudeau administration revisited efforts towards northern ports, with reports that Canada will once again invest in facilities. Current PM Carney has reiterated these efforts in the Canadian Arctic in a new security statement. Although Carney has yet to specify port facilities, he has committed Canada to $420M CAD spending to “allow the military to have a greater, sustained and year-round presence in the Arctic, and will expand its training and deployment,” including land-based radars (mentioned above), doubling the number of Canadian Rangers for the bases (to 4,000), and the purchase of two additional icebreakers.
In addition to the port facilities, Canada needs more capital ships and icebreakers for patrol, safety, and security. To that end Canada’s Irving Shipbuilding began building the River Class Destroyers in June of 2024. The 15 ships will supplement and modernize the current fleet according to the National Shipbuilding Strategy. In addition to capital ships, Canada is already planning for more icebreakers, predominantly to keep the sea lanes clear in the early and late sailing seasons, but also for search and rescue of trapped ships. Additionally, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) will expand its submarine fleet with purchases of twelve new boats. Finally, the Canadian Coast Guard is being brought into the DND to address several of the reasons stated above.
Canada has a dedicated shipbuilding capability, including three major shipbuilding companies: Irving Shipbuilding in Halifax, Seaspan in Vancouver, and Chantier Davie in Lévis, Québec, all busy building ships for the RCN and Canadian Coast Guard. Thus, with the infrastructure to build ships, port facilities, and legacy and new platforms, Canada is in a strong position to control, defend, and preserve the NSR and sovereign territory from the sea.
SPACE
The most exciting and newest component of the argument is Canada’s efforts in space to facilitate the coordination of the air and surface capabilities for the protection and control of the NSR. Currently, Canada relies far too heavily on the U.S. for space security and thus this component will require attention, expenditure, and expansion. Fortunately, space security also presents the most opportunity for Canadian excellence and development that will have significant long-term benefits for Canada.
First and foremost are the actual launch facilities that Canada will have to construct and improve. The Canadian Government must immediately increase investment in the growth of Maritime Launch and its Spaceport Nova Scotia. This civilian-led effort will launch Canada (pun intended) into the spacefaring age with domestic orbital launch, as part of the world’s very small group of spacefaring nations. Canada must also build a government-owned facility, preferably further north, for government specific launches for national security. The world is in a new space race, and Canada needs to have domestic launch capabilities for both commercial and military-government space access. With increasing tensions between Canada and the U.S., Canada has two options, build domestic capability or turn to another launch provider. But instead of paying someone else to launch Canadian hardware, Canada has the opportunity to build its own capability.
Canada already leads the world in on-orbit mechanical manipulation with a series of CanadArms fitted to U.S. systems. Beginning with the Space Shuttle era, and culminating with the ISS and future Artemis projects, Canada has supplied mechanical manipulation devices for various space projects. Canada needs to expand its space industry to include domestic rocket and satellite manufacture, fuels, and controls. This will not only increase Canada’s space capacity and presence, it will create jobs, have a positive influence on secondary education and workforce development, and increase government and industry revenue streams. When Canada gets to the point of manufacturing and launching Canadian systems, the world will turn to Canada as a trusted agent for space. Canada is ideally suited to lead the world in ISAM (In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing) for refueling, repairing, and building satellites and space stations.
In addition to launch facilities paired with industry and education is the control capability for Canadian Space. Currently Canadian military officers assist at launch facilities at Vandenberg Space Force Base, California and Cape Canaveral, Florida (specifically Patrick Space Force Base), as well as a team at NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command) in Colorado. There is an even smaller team of space operations experts in Ottawa at the Canadian Space Operations Centre (CanSpOC), part of 7 Space Operations Squadron (7 SOPS). If there is a full break from the U.S., Canada can simply bulk up 7 SOPS and the new RCAF 3 Canadian Space Division, leaving the U.S. commands and returning to Canada for duty. With the team in place to monitor, control, and analyze Canadian space capabilities, the conversation must return to the importance of space for the NSR.
Canada today has several satellites on orbit including Sapphire and Polar Epsilon. However, Canada relies on other satellites and countries for high north ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance). Canada absolutely could continue in this trend – relying on others – however, this strategy argues for the domestic capability of manufacture, launch, and control so that Canada has the in-house capability to monitor, protect, and control its own sovereign territory without reliance on others, which will have to be expanded. Furthermore, especially in the space domain, if Canada decides to improve domestic manufacturing, launch, and control, it will immediately gain customers and allies for access to and through the space domain.
The importance of strong Canadian space capabilities for monitoring of the Far North and the NSR cannot be understated.
DIPLOMACY
Finally, Canada must use diplomacy to safeguard its sovereignty and interests in the Far North. Canada will need to work through the UN to uphold the international laws, norms, and custom of the NSR and sovereignty. Through the committees like UNCOPUOS (United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space) and DOALOS (Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea) Canada will be able to help lead the discussions on the future of the sea route. In turn, Canada will seek out new allies and partners for monitoring and protection of the Arctic, knowing full well that a robust alliance is necessary; Canada cannot do this alone. In the face of U.S. toxicity and Russia’s belligerence, Canada needs to build an alliance of friendly Arctic partners for security. Reaching out to Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, Finland, the UK, and Japan will usher in a new era of Arctic security and cooperation.
Canada excels at diplomacy. Trusted among most nations of the world, Canada represents the best of democracy and socially acceptable capitalism in the modern age. And with increasing tensions amongst the traditional historical alliances, Canada will emerge as a cornerstone of any reliable and rational Arctic strategy.
To every extent possible, Canada should strive for national security of Canadian Sovereign territorial waters and land in the NSR and Far North. To do this, Canada’s government must invest in land, sea, air, and space capabilities for monitoring, control, search and rescue, and if needed to repel. Canada stands on the threshold of the future and has an opportunity to lead the world in security and capability in the midst of chaos and uncertainty.
To every extent possible, Canada should strive for national security of Canadian Sovereign territorial waters and land in the NSR and Far North. To do this, Canada’s government must invest in land, sea, air, and space capabilities for monitoring, control, search and rescue, and if needed to repel. Canada stands on the threshold of the future and has an opportunity to lead the world in security and capability in the midst of chaos and uncertainty.
Dr. S. Mike Pavelec is a Guest Contributor. The views expressed here are his own and do not necessarily reflect a CDR editorial position.
