Reshaping CANSOFCOM
Canada and its allies are faced with a rapidly changing global security environment, in which great power competition, strategic deterrence, and high-intensity warfare have now become the CAF’s top defence priorities. However, given their extensive skillset and utility in both unconventional and conventional warfare, Special Operation Forces remain an indispensable military asset. With this in mind, CDR asked its Writer, Richard Nghiem, to explore some ‘out-of-the-box’ ideas on how the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) can expand its capabilities and maintain its strategic and operational relevancy in a future conventional conflict. Here is our report.
For the past two decades, special operations forces (SOF) have been Ottawa’s military tool of choice to fight terrorism and conduct Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations around the globe. Their ability to surgically achieve strategic effects and covertly serve the national interest with a small logistical footprint is highly appealing as it provides the Canadian government with a wide scope of viable, low-risk, and cost-effective policy options.
However, today, Ottawa and its allies are faced with a vastly different global security environment, in which Russia and China are highly aggressive revisionist powers, set on completely remodeling the international system. This shift in focus away from counterterrorism and COIN, however, raises a critical question of whether SOF will still have an important role in today’s new era of great power competition.
The value proposition of SOF has traditionally been to provide battlefield effects that support the joint forces’ large scale combat operations vs fighting as an integrated element with conventional ground forces. However, the integration of special operations soldiers with conventional ground units engaged in large-scale combat operations has already been implemented by some nations and was proven was proven to be not only possible, but also highly effective. SOF can be a substantive player in a traditional warfare scenario such as a peer-on-peer conflict as they can undertake a myriad of tasks.
First, SOF can act as an economy of force measure, striking certain targets which allow conventional aviation assets to conduct higher priority air missions. As an example, on the very first mission of Operation Desert Storm, US SOF conducted a raid on an Iraqi early warning/ground control intercept site. Originally, F-117 stealth attack aircraft were considered for this mission, but by using SOF assets, the F-117s were able to be re-tasked for higher priority strikes in Baghdad.
These elite direct-action ground units can also enable synergistic attacks which describe a coordinated approach where SOF and conventional assets combine their strengths to achieve a greater impact than either could alone. This operational concept typically involves special operators such as Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) pinpointing targets with laser designators, gathering real-time intelligence, and acting as forward observers while conventional forces provide the firepower. To examine the effectiveness of such a concept, one only needs to look at the war in Ukraine where Ukrainian SOF have repeatedly located, identified, and ‘painted’ Russian S-400 air defence batteries and called in precision HIMARS strikes against them, creating a secure gap int unique Russian airspace for ‘kamikaze’ drones and HIMARS-fired ATACMSs [Army Tactical Missile System] to fly through to hit high value targets (HVTs) such as communication nodes, oil refineries, airbases, and ammunition depots.
Thirdly, SOF are particularly well suited for maneuver warfare as they can leverage a variety of airborne and sea-borne insertion capabilities to conduct surgical strikes, direct-action raids and sabotage missions against critical rear echelon vulnerabilities and mobile, concealed HVTs beyond the operational reach of conventional maneuver forces. Additionally, with their unique ability to provide ‘break-in’ forcible entry into theatre, SOF can quickly seize vital airfields and ports, and transform them into forward air and long-range fire bases.
That being said, having outlined many of the combat capabilities of special operators, these elite commandos are not relied upon for just war fighting tasks. They can conduct Search and Rescue (SAR) operations, logistics functions, collect intelligence, and even manage airfield operations at austere locations. As a result, given their extensive skillset and utility in both unconventional and conventional warfare, SOF remain an indispensable military asset.
RELEVANCY OF CDN SOF
However, while elite units such as the US Navy Seals and the British SAS are highly capable of shifting their strategic focus towards high-intensity warfare and are already reorienting themselves for such a fight, Canada’s SOF, as of right now, do not seem to be following suit. Since the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) withdrawal from Afghanistan, Ottawa’s main defence priority has been strengthening the Nation’s Arctic security. One can make a strong argument that in the event of a conflict, the Nation’s elite troops would be ineffective due to the fact that they do not regularly operate alongside conventional land forces and are not accustomed to integrated combined arms operations.
Certain Canadian defence experts will surely dispute this claim by pointing to CANSOFCOM’s involvement in Operation UNIFIER and its critical contributions to the training of numerous Regular Units of the Ukrainian Ground Forces. However, most of this instruction was limited to light infantry tactics, close quarter battle exercises, guerrilla warfare maneuvers, and weapons training. Crucial lessons or guidance for conventional war fighting regarding coordination and communication with armoured forces, close air support assets, and long-range precision fires units were not provided by Canadian special operations trainers. While this is not necessarily a reflection of the training forces’ overall capabilities, CANSOFCOM must quickly adapt its doctrine to prioritize high-intensity conventional warfare as well as strategic deterrence, acquire new capabilities, and modernize its equipment in preparation for a future conventional conflict or risk becoming strategically and operationally irrelevant.
NEW DOCTRINE
For those who may be unaware, CANSOFCOM is organized into a headquarters element and five units: Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2); Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR); 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron (SOAS); Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit (CJIRU); and Canadian Special Operations Training Centre (CSOTC). In order for CANSOFCOM to adapt its doctrine to prioritize high-intensity conventional warfare, the integration of JTF2 and CSOR units with regular active-duty mechanized brigade groups and CF-35 fighter squadrons must be made a top priority, as these detachments would serve as highly effective force multipliers.
Particularly well trained in conducting special reconnaissance and maritime surveillance operations with small, portable, low-signature Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) to provide real-time Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) coverage, these elite operators could not only direct combat aircraft for close-air support and other offensive missions but also provide aerospace and maritime warning for NORAD. Such capabilities would prove to be critical if Russia or China were to conduct a naval incursion into the Nation’s territorial waters as Canadian special operations soldiers could quickly detect these hostile warships, update the CAF’s common operational picture, and call in long-range strikes from numerous attack platforms. These include NMESISs, MQ-9B UCAVs, F-35As, armed Long Range Unmanned Surface Vessels (LRUSV), or repurposed CC-130s and CC-177s, carrying Rapid Dragon Palletized Effects Systems.
Additionally, small CSOR and JTF2 contingents, serving as advance teams for the Air Force’s forward deployed CF-35s, would be extremely adept at establishing and managing airfield operations at austere locations. They could quickly deploy Mobile Aircraft Arresting Systems to facilitate fighter aircraft recovery on permanent or temporary runways, conduct ‘hot refueling’ and rearming tasks to quickly get combat aircraft ‘back into the fight’ and even perform air traffic control duties to manage takeoffs and landings.
Last, but not least, it is imperative that CANSOFCOM undergoes significant changes in terms of force design and gradually grows to comprise new, separate units with specific, specialized mission sets and capabilities that can enhance the command’s ability to execute complex air and maritime combat operations along with Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) missions, all of which are critical for fighting and winning a conventional war.
GROWING THE FORCE
However, for these recommended changes along with others to be properly implemented, CANSOFCOM must try to expand its ranks by an additional 1,000-1,500 operators by considering a new recruiting plan that will allow highly driven and high-achieving civilians off the street to try out for SOF selection without having to spend numerous years in a conventional unit. This proposed approach has the potential to entice significantly more people to attempt to join Canada’s SOF as the allure of being able to take part in a wide variety of complex combat operations and be deployed all over the world is far greater than that of participating in increasingly dull and repetitive exercises in the regular Army for several years. It also importantly takes into account the hard reality that Canada’s troops are becoming increasingly overweight and obese, with 72 percent of armed forces personnel falling into those two categories. By allowing more physically fit civilians to directly try out for SOF selection, this recruitment plan will significantly expand the candidate pool and compensate for the limited supply of qualified candidates for Special Operations Forces within the CAF.
Such an approach is not unprecedented as in the US, civilian street-to-SOF programs do exist and include the Special Forces 18-XRay option, the 75th Ranger Regiment’s Option 40, and the Naval Special Warfare Command’s SEAL Challenge. Similarly, the Australian military allows civilians to try out for a place in the elite 1st and 2nd Commando Regiments with the Special Forces Direct Recruitment Scheme while the New Zealand armed forces have a program where non-military applicants can try out for the New Zealand Special Air Service. This shift in policy is absolutely essential to enhance not only the organization’s war fighting capacity and capabilities, but also its presence around the world. It will also ensure that CANSOFCOM has the right mix of people with the right sort of background, education, language, ethnicity, and gender that will allow it to continue to effectively conduct clandestine, high-risk missions and complement Canadian conventional forces in multi-domain operations.
TRAINING & FORCE DESIGN CHANGES
While this increased emphasis on recruiting and force expansion is absolutely critical, in light of the evolving dynamics in global conflict and security, there is also a compelling argument for a comprehensive redesign of the structure, training, and strategic focus of Canada’s special operations forces. With the proliferation of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environments around the world and the growing military threat posed by Russia and China in both the Arctic and Indo-Pacific, CANSOFCOM must shift its primary mission focus towards high-intensity warfare and immediately start reorienting its forces for such a fight. However, this shift in focus will require significantly different and more sophisticated capabilities that cannot merely be surged from standing SOF forces during a crisis but would require the creation of new specialized units. It also requires a dedicated investment and adaptation in training, basing, and equipment.
For example, enhanced technological training related to cyber operations, electronic warfare, and drone software programming must be prioritized. It is also imperative that region-specific training, permanent regional stationing, and warfare specialization be made the norm within CANSOFCOM. SOF units identified to deploy to a specific region like the Arctic, as an example, would undergo rigorous Arctic warfare training at both Canadian and allied training facilities and then be specifically trained and equipped for operations exclusively in the polar domain. This Arctic or Polar SOF unit would include both active and reserve components and would routinely forward deploy to bases in Nunavut, the Northwest Territories, and other allied countries to maintain and enhance their war fighting capabilities. SOF elements deployed to other regions like the Indo-Pacific would also follow the same training, rotational deployment, and basing structure, but be specialized in jungle and amphibious warfare instead, for example.
Lastly, new specialized units within CANSOFCOM would include a Special Boat Service, Multi-Domain Task Force, and Para-rescue units. The formation and integration of these separate new organizations into CANSOFCOM could enhance the command’s ability to execute complex air and maritime combat operations and improve its CSAR capabilities.
SPECIAL BOAT SERVICE
A prime example of a new, separate organization that should be stood up within the command is a Special Boat Service (SBS). With the longest coastline in the world bordering three different oceans and a vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Canada is unquestionably a maritime nation. Events at sea have an immediate impact on Canadians’ lives as the country’s economy is intrinsically dependent on global maritime trade, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. However, this region is currently home to a number of serious security concerns with tensions rising in the strategically important South China Sea, a vital global trade artery. Canada needs a modern, powerful navy to protect international shipping lanes and its maritime interests. However, with China’s A2/AD capabilities now extending all the way to Guam, Harpoon or Naval Strike missiles are unlikely to be the answer to challenges on the high seas. Instead, more and more situations will likely require more subtle, covert solutions, which can only be provided by a versatile world-class Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) as well as a team of highly trained Special Boat Service (SBS) operators.
To put it bluntly, if Canada wants to support peace, stability, and security throughout the Indo-Pacific, it is essential that its navy and special operations soldiers are ready to conduct both high-intensity conventional warfare as well as covert maritime special operations.
Examples of non-kinetic maritime special operations that SBS operators could undertake include covert beach scouting in preparation for large-scale amphibious landings, coastal surveillance and intelligence gathering, and special reconnaissance for accurately locating and targeting strategic assets like long-range bomber bases, air defence batteries, or mobile missile launchers. Moving from non-kinetic special operations to more combat-oriented missions, SBS operators would also be tasked with conducting amphibious raids, executing anti-ship attacks using loitering munitions or one-way attack Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs), and sabotaging ships and harbours by infilling via submarines or parachute drops. Ultimately, this elite unit, if created, would be the Nation’s force of choice to execute the most dangerous, demanding, and extreme littoral or amphibious assault missions anytime, anywhere across the globe.
However, as enticing as that may sound, the development and standing up of such a unit would be extremely difficult given its many specializations and capabilities. As a result, CANSOFCOM must request support from the UK Special Forces to form a liaison team with Britain’s SBS, and the US’ Naval Special Warfare Development Group, unofficially known as SEAL Team Six, to receive advice, guidance, and support on how to establish new capabilities, and shape force development.
For example, to create a SBS unit, Canada would need to construct a specialized training program that focuses on combat diving, shore reconnaissance, amphibious raids, infiltration, combat tactics and weapons training, close quarters battle (CQB) training, military free-fall parachuting, HALO [High Altitude-Low Opening] insertion, concealment, ISR, and scuba diving. Applicants must also undergo SERE [Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape] and Arctic warfare and survival skills training for potential deployments to the Far North.
Besides the training aspect of developing a new SBS, significant investments must also be made in new Special Operations Craft (SOC) and swimmer delivery vehicles or mini-subs as these platforms would be heavily relied upon by Canada’s special operators to conduct maritime special operations. Furthermore, from an organizational perspective, to avoid duplication of effort with the RCN, the Naval Tactical Operations Group and Clearance Divers on both coasts should also be integrated into the new SBS unit. All of these measures, collectively, would enable a credible starting point to grow the unit.
MULTI-DOMAIN TASK FORCE
Having said that, while it is critical that the maritime domain becomes more of a focal point for CANSOFCOM, the comprehensive redesign of the organization also requires a greater focus on the electromagnetic and cyber realms along with ISR collection capabilities. As warfare becomes more reliant on technology, SOF units must be adept in cyber operations and electronic warfare. To achieve these objectives, a new Multi-Domain Task Force should be created and integrated into CANSOFCOM. This separate organization would consist of several small non-kinetic effects teams composed of drone software engineers and operators, EW experts, as well as cyber warfare specialists. Such units, if deployed, would be able to disrupt an adversary’s AI systems via data poisoning cyberattacks, electronically jam enemy radar and weapons platforms, and conduct valuable ISR missions.
Additionally, these high-tech non-kinetic effects squads could be the future of SEAD [Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses] operations as the use of aircraft or UASs for EW missions against enemy air defence radars may no longer be effective given China’s and Russia’s growing A2/AD capabilities. To solve this issue, forward deployed special operators could potentially be called upon to serve as the jamming platform. This would open the airspace for CF-35s and CF-18s to successfully conduct their combat missions. Most importantly, though, with SOF teams being more maneuverable and difficult to engage than traditional airborne SEAD platforms, the risk of Canadian casualties would be greatly reduced.
PARA-RESCUE UNIT
Last, but not least, CANSOFCOM should also seriously consider the formation of a separate elite Para-rescue unit, capable of deploying in any available manner, to include air-land-sea tactics, into contested combat environments to authenticate, extract, treat, stabilize, provide medical treatment, and evacuate injured personnel. Members of this force, commonly known as pararescue jumpers (PJs), would be organized into small squads of four or five operators and attached to other special operations units within the command to not only provide combat medical support and engage hostile forces while performing hot casualty evacuations, but also conduct surgeries while airborne if needed. Ultimately, this elite contingent, if created, would be the Nation’s force of choice to execute the most perilous, demanding, and extreme CSAR missions anytime, anywhere across the globe.
However, similar to the idea of a new SBS, the development and standing up of such a unit would be extremely difficult given its many specializations and capabilities. As a result, CANSOFCOM must send a request for assistance to the USAF 24th Special Tactics Squadron to form a liaison team and receive advice, guidance, and support.
NEW AIRCRAFT
If CANSOFCOM is to maintain a high level of autonomy as well as technological overmatch with a view to supporting its operations into the future, it must reduce its reliance on logistics and combat platforms supplied by the military’s traditional service branches and procure new equipment in preparation for a future conventional conflict. Before we delve into some of these options it’s important to note that the addition of any new capabilities/equipment requires more than just additional operators. They would require a greater support tail and most likely additional infrastructure.
This modernization process must first and foremost start with the 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron (SOAS) which is in a dire state of repair. If a high-end conflict were to start tomorrow which would entail entering a highly contested A2/AD environment, the 427 SOAS’s aging CH-146 utility helicopters would not be able to survive. It is therefore imperative that CANSOFCOM replaces its aging Griffon helicopters with new, larger, and more versatile V-280 Valor multi-mission tilt-rotor aircraft from Bell which can more effectively insert special operators behind enemy lines while evading enemy air defences in complex terrain and transport significant amounts of equipment for logistical support. Altogether, this tilt-rotor aircraft, if purchased, will revolutionize the way that Canadian SOF fight on the battlefield.
Having said that, the squadron should also be significantly expanded to include additional CC-130s and CC-177s, solely dedicated to and fully under the control of CANSOFCOM. Such a change is vital as it would reduce the 427 SOAS’s reliance on the RCAF for strategic airlift and allow CANSOFCOM to quickly move people, materiel, equipment and supplies around the world at a moment’s notice. This buildup, additionally, must continue to include the acquisition of niche assets, specifically seaplanes. With growing tensions between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific region, if war were to break out, major ship losses and mass casualty events at sea, at a level not seen since WWII, would be all but guaranteed. Not only that, but logistics operations would also be extremely difficult to conduct given the lack of undamaged runways or ports within theatre. In such a scenario, runway independent seaplanes would be incredibly valuable assets as they could be used for long-range air-sea CSAR operations, airborne resupply missions, and large-scale SOF aerial insertions.
Lastly, to complete the redesign of the 427 SOAS, CANSOFCOM must procure Bell Invictus 360 or AH-64E Apache Guardian attack helicopters to not only protect these new rotary and strategic transport aircraft, but also provide Close Air Support (CAS) for Canadian special operations soldiers on the ground, a capability that Canada has lacked for so many decades. Recently retired AC-130 gunships from the US along with additional MQ-9B SkyGuardian drones should also be purchased to further bolster CANSOFCOM’s CAS arsenal. Collectively, these assets would be capable of delivering overwhelming fire support, in the form of hundreds of Hellfire missiles, Hydra rockets, 500-pound GBU-12 Paveway II laser guided bombs, and 105mm howitzer and 30mm auto cannon fire.
MARITIME CRAFT
CANSOFCOM’s need for new equipment is not limited to just the air domain. New Special Operations Craft and mini-submarines are also required to equip a future SBS. With regards to the former, Juliet Marine Systems’ Ghost, a super-cavitating stealth ship, should be at the top of Ottawa’s procurement list. The Ghost uses a dual-pontoon super-cavitating hull, known as the small waterplane-area twin-hull (SWATH), to sail at a top speed of nearly 50knots. It is also virtually invisible to radar detection and can perform several types of missions, including anti-surface warfare (ASuW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and mine countermeasures (MCM) due to its highly flexible weapons load out. To showcase this effective ‘modular open systems approach’, for ASuW, the Ghost is armed with a M197 20mm rotary cannon, BGM-176B Griffin missiles, and Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System rockets along with an electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor and radar.
However, as impressive as the Ghost’s speed, stealth, and weapons systems are, the real value of the special operations craft is its ability to transport and deploy significant numbers of special operations soldiers over long distances. In terms of troop capacity, the Ghost has a crew of 3-5 sailors and can carry up to 16 Canadian special operators along with all of their combat equipment. Furthermore, as a bonus capability, it can be partially disassembled to fit in an RCAF CC-177 Globemaster III for transport if needed, enabling it to be deployed anywhere around the world.
In the event that Canada’s SBS requires a more covert, subtle platform for the insertion of special operators, DND should consider purchasing new Dry Combat Submersibles (DCS) which have a crew of two–a pilot and a co-pilot/navigator–and can transport eight fully equipped “frogmen”. The DCS, in terms of performance, is stated to have a maximum depth rating of 100 metres and Lock In and Out maximum depth of 30 metres as well as an impressive range of 60 nm. What is more important, though, is that unlike most other swimmer delivery vehicles, the DCS actually provides a comfortable dry environment for its occupants. This feature is extremely beneficial as it enables maritime special operators to arrive at the mission warm, rested, hydrated and ready to undertake longer combat swims in colder water. Operating DCSs would also allow Canada’s SBS operators to communicate more easily than in previous wet submarines, where they had to rely on intercoms and could not see each other.
GROUND PLATFORMS
For Canadian special operators to effectively complement the Nation’s conventional forces in multi-domain operations, the modernization of CANSOFCOM’s ground combat equipment must be of the utmost priority as wars are ultimately won on the ground. It is therefore imperative that DND purchases new lightweight armed unmanned ground platforms, tactical all-terrain vehicles, Polaris MRZR Dune Buggies, and utility off-road vehicles equipped with CUAS.
The acquisition of such small, compact, but specialized platforms is highly desirable given CANSOFCOM’s composition of mainly small elite fighting units. Newly procured Autonomous Uncrewed Ground Vehicles (A-UGVs) such as Rheinmetall Canada’s Mission Master XTs, for example, could be utilized to accompany and support small units of special operations troops during all kinds of missions, in a wide variety of challenging environments. With its robust mobility across extreme terrain and advanced amphibious capabilities, the Mission Master XT can reliably transport a platoon’s worth of sensors and weapon systems to greatly augment these SOF units’ range and firepower with heavier-calibre weapons and larger optics than they would otherwise be able to carry. Additionally, due to its compact size, this UGV could be transported inside a RCAF CH-147 Chinook or C-130 Hercules and parachuted out the back of the aircraft, into hostile territory, to provide combat or logistical support to Canadian special operations soldiers.
That being said, while ground drones are highly attractive due to their cheap cost and expendability, there are numerous combat situations where crewed tactical all-terrain vehicles are still needed as even the most capable UGVs can be hampered by certain topography. The purchase of armoured BvS10s from BAE Systems would easily address this capability gap. With the ability to rapidly traverse snow-covered mountainous Arctic territory that would hinder most vehicles, these tracked amphibious all-terrain vehicles would enable CSOR and JTF2 units to more effectively conduct surveillance and sovereignty patrol operations in the Far North. They are also designed to be able to integrate with a wide-range of weaponry and specialized equipment, while maintaining additional flexibility to be equipped for future mission needs. As a result, with numerous variants, these vehicles can support Canadian SOF in both a logistic and combat capacity, serving as mortar platforms, armoured personnel carriers, remote weapon stations, anti-tank missile platforms, and loitering munition launch vehicles. However, despite all of its capabilities and versatility, the BvS10 is slightly deficient in two areas: speed and transportability.
CANSOFCOM must therefore also procurePolaris MRZR 4×4 all-terrain vehicles, armed with TOW anti-tank missiles, .50 caliber M2 machine guns and 40mm Heckler & Koch GMG automatic grenade launchers, to increase the agility, nimbleness, and lethality of its special operations units. MRZRs are already designed to offer significant off-road mobility and have a top speed of 100 mph. Furthermore, in their standard configuration, they can be internally stored inside larger helicopters, such as the CH-47 Chinook, and rapidly deployed to other areas. More importantly, though, with mounted weapons having the advantage of not having to be unloaded, setup, and then reloaded, Polaris MRZRs would encourage operators to take the initiative and utilize shoot-and-scoot tactics, maximizing their combat effectiveness. Canadian units with these vehicles therefore could sneak up on enemy tanks, IFVs, or APCs, potentially via areas where friendly conventional forces could not go, launch their TOW wire-guided missiles, and then quickly withdraw to safety. They could also engage and neutralize enemy infantry by employing the vehicle’s mounted .50 caliber M2 heavy machine gun and Heckler & Koch GMG automatic grenade launcher. Worth noting: in 2016 Canada procured DAGOR vehicles from Polaris as part of its Ultra-Light Combat Vehicle (ULCV) project.
Altogether, Mission Master XTs, armoured BvS10s, and Polaris MRZR 4×4 all-terrain vehicles, when combined, would offer Canada’s special operations units valuable additional firepower, speed, mobility, and flexibility, all of which would be critical to have in a conventional war.
OTTAWA’S FORCE OF CHOICE
Overall, while Ottawa and its allies, today, are faced with a rapidly changing global security environment, in which great power competition, strategic deterrence, and high-intensity warfare in an increasingly multipolar world have now become the CAF’s top defence priorities, CANSOFCOM is unfortunately unprepared for dealing with such challenges. A more alarming reality, however, is that Canada’s special operations soldiers do not regularly operate alongside conventional land forces and are not well accustomed to integrated combined arms operations.
This glaring capability gap is proving to be highly problematic in light of a growing geopolitical power shift and a return to big power rivalry reminiscent of the Cold War. There is a compelling argument for a comprehensive redesign of the structure, training, and strategic focus of Canada’s elite combat units. CANSOFCOM must shift its primary mission focus towards high-intensity conventional warfare and strategic deterrence and immediately start reorienting its forces for such a fight. If these changes are fully embraced, JTF2 and CSOR units will become not only powerful force multipliers for the conventional military, but also highly interoperable partners with other Tier 1 units around the world. More importantly, Canada’s SOF’s ability to anticipate, adapt and change in accordance with the shifting security environment and still achieve strategic effects and serve the national interest with a small logistical footprint will ensure that they will continue to be viewed as an indispensable military asset and Ottawa’s ‘force of choice’.
Richard Nghiem is a Regular CDR Contributor
