We’ve witnessed the ‘unthinkable’ happen when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, bringing active conflict back to Europe. In response, Canada has stepped-up to provide support through the Canadian-led Multinational Brigade Latvia. But what if China decided to invade Taiwan? An invasion of the island nation, which was deemed unthinkable for decades, is now a very real possibility. China’s President, Xi Jinping, has publicly given the order for the PLA to be ready by 2027 to invade Taiwan. In such a scenario, what kind of support could Canada provide to its allies? CDR asked its writer, Richard Nghiem, to look at some of the ways Canada might be called on to help and highlight areas where it can increase its capabilities and capacities in the region. Here is our report.
Is Canada Ready?
For over 30 years since the end of the Cold War, America and its Pacific allies, including Canada, have enjoyed an unprecedented era of peace, stability, and economic prosperity. Historically poor countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and the former British colony of Hong Kong, during this time period, rapidly developed into high-tech, high-income economies, becoming leading international financial centers and electronic component manufacturing hubs. This was made possible in large part due to widespread acceptance of free trade throughout the Indo-Pacific and the US’ ability to maintain unquestioned naval superiority as well as law and order in the region. However, with the destabilizing rise of an aggressive and assertive China, this glorious era may be nearing an end.
Since becoming the President of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012, President Xi Jinping has consistently pushed forward an expansionist foreign policy, making increasingly bolder moves in several key areas across Asia in an attempt to reinforce China’s position as not only a regional hegemon, but also a global superpower, equal to the United States. From sailing its most advanced warships into Japanese territorial waters and around the disputed Senkaku Islands, to clashing with Indian forces over the Himalayan Sino-Indian border, to constructing artificial, militarized islands in the South China Sea, China is clearly intent on expanding its territorial boundaries, regardless of any international condemnation. It seems that the CCP now has its eyes set on Taiwan as the PLA, in recent years, has dramatically increased its activity near the island by flying hundreds of PLAAF aircraft into the island nation’s air defence identification zone, conducting high-profile dual carrier strike group operations around the small country, and executing several large-scale beach assault drills.
CANADA’S INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY
As a result, due to the region’s significant geopolitical importance and China’s increasingly belligerent behaviour, Ottawa, in 2022, released its much-heralded and long-awaited Indo-Pacific Strategy. The strategy framework set out Canada as a Pacific nation and outlined the Nation’s ultimate Indo-Pacific national interest in one clean sentence: “Encompassing 40 economies, over four billion people, and $47.19 trillion in economic activity, it is the world’s fastest growing region and home to six of Canada’s top 13 trading partners.” The document also highlighted the Nation’s overwhelming dependency on Pacific-based maritime trade, freedom of navigation, maritime security, and Taiwanese-made semiconductors which it needs to manufacture everything from cars to planes to military weapon systems. Without these chips, high-tech manufacturing in Canada along with the economy would be severely disrupted. More interestingly, though, the paper was uncharacteristically blunt regarding the rise of China. It described China as “an increasingly disruptive global power,” warning that it had “benefitted from the rules-based international order to grow and prosper,” but that it was now “actively seeking to reinterpret these rules” to become the “leading power in the region.” This can be seen in China’s disregard for UN rulings on territorial disputes in the South China Sea, its actions to further militarize that region, and its significant use of electoral interference in foreign countries which have had significant implications in the region as well as Canada.
Adhering to these claims, Ottawa’s Indo-Pacific Strategy called for a greater role for the CAF in the region and allocated additional funds to DND to sustain a forward presence of three frigates in the Indo-Pacific on an annual basis. Canadian military participation in multinational regional exercises along with RCAF Taiwan Strait surveillance flights would also be significantly increased while CAF staff officers would be integrated within the defence headquarters of Ottawa’s Indo-Pacific allies and security partners to enhance interoperability. Lastly, new military capacity building programs with CANSOF instructors for Indo-Pacific countries and state-of-the-art cyber defence organizations, tasked with detecting and responding to increasing cyber security threats originating in the region, including malicious activity targeting Canadian businesses, industry and infrastructure, would be developed.
However, when compared to the CAF’s current footprint in Europe in support of NATO against Russia and its presence in Afghanistan during the height of Operation ATHENA from 2003-2005, these outlined ‘commitments’ are nothing more than a mere token gesture. While this may be seen by many as an unfair and completely inappropriate comparison, it is not; a new Cold War is already underway in the Indo-Pacific and Ottawa must act accordingly by significantly increasing the Nation’s combat capabilities and capacities in the region.
IMPORTANCE OF SUBMARINES
IN A POTENTIAL WAR WITH CHINA
With Chinese President Xi Jinping having already publicly given the order for the PLA to be ready by 2027 to invade Taiwan along with the ongoing rapid build up of the PLAN and the US Navy’s gradual decline in the region, an invasion of the island nation, which was deemed unthinkable for decades, is now a very real possibility. If such a conflict were to occur, the US military, for the first time in 80 years, would struggle to respond as China’s massive A2/AD apparatus, particularly the PLARF’s extensive anti-ship and land-attack missile arsenal, integrated sensor network, and weapons engagement zone (WEZ) range would effectively impede force projection from US and allied airfields and carrier strike groups. American guided missile cruisers and destroyers would also be highly vulnerable to a wide range of other threats including long-range bombers, sea mines, and Chinese attack submarines.
As such, it would be highly unlikely that these aforementioned assets would be utilized to partake significantly in “first days of war” operations, that is, to be involved in the opening efforts to ‘kick down’ China’s ‘A2/AD door,’ particularly where the PLA’s defences would be at their strongest. That said, the US still possesses three extremely survivable deep-strike platforms that stand a good chance of dismantling this access-denial barrier and executing an effective maritime interdiction campaign in the Taiwan Strait: its Air Force stealth bombers and its Navy’s nuclear-powered attack (SSN) and cruise-missile submarines (SSGN).
With regards to the latter, Ohio-class SSGNs are each capable of launching 154 Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAMs) in as “little time as six minutes,” enabling them to deliver a large “pulse” of firepower that would be pivotal during the opening stages of a counter-A2/AD campaign. This pulse could be unleashed on a variety of high-value targets such as PLA mobile DF-26 missile launchers, HQ-9 air defence batteries, strategic over-the-horizon-radars, bomber bases, and command-and-control (C2) nodes. These submarines’ stealthiness and low observability would also allow them to penetrate deep inside the ‘first island chain’, undetected, and conduct offensive operations well within Chinese territorial waters. Therefore, if war were to break out with Beijing over Taiwan, one could envision an advanced force of SSGNs launching massive cruise missile strikes on mainland China to essentially “blind” land-based sensors, strike and destroy “shooter” platforms deep inland, and significantly degrade the PLA’s overall “kill chain” network, thereby creating a more permissive environment for US air and naval forces to operate in.
With the “access-denial door” kicked down and the ‘playing field’ levelled, US Navy carrier strike groups (CSGs) could be surged closer to Taiwan and the Chinese coast, with relative safety before deploying their tactical aircraft. This would enable the US to not only deploy enough air-to-air fighters to deny the PLAAF air superiority over Taiwan, but also maximize its maritime striking power. Simultaneously, the full might of the Air Force’s non-stealthy fighter jets, bombers, and aerial support assets could also be brought to bear against the Chinese invasion fleet. Altogether, this surge of follow-on forces into theatre would dramatically increase America’s chances of successfully defending Taiwan.
These aforementioned operations, however, would only constitute half of America’s defence efforts in a potential war with Beijing over Taiwan as America’s SSNs would also conduct a large-scale maritime interdiction campaign. With advanced noise quieting technologies such as anechoic tiles and pump jet propulsion systems, Seawolf- and Virginia-class SSNs would skillfully evade PLAN anti-submarine warfare (ASW) defences and infiltrate China’s massive invasion fleet of amphibious assault ships, troop transports, civilian ferries, commercial cargo ships, and maritime militia boats in the Taiwan Strait, sinking hundreds of vessels with their large arsenals of heavy weight torpedoes. Such attrition would drastically reduce the number of PLA troops and supplies that would make it ashore, allowing for Taiwanese forces to potentially crush the invasion force right on the beach. With no beachhead secured and its armada crippled, China would effectively be denied the ability to take Taiwan.
However, while the Silent Service [The “Silent Service” is the nickname for the US Navy’s submarine force] is currently capable of maintaining a robust defence of the island nation, its capacity to do so, a decade from now, is in serious question. The Navy’s overall fleet of SSNs is projected to decrease from 53 today to as low as 42 by the 2030s, before growing again. This potential shortfall would pose a critical deterrent problem and therefore necessitate the assistance of traditional US allies in the undersea domain in the near future. Such security partners include Japan, South Korea, Australia, and potentially Canada. With Ottawa’s recent DPU outlining the Nation’s plans to acquire 12 new patrol submarines, the RCN could, for the first time in decades, be a major player in the Indo-Pacific and a significant member of a potential defence coalition for Taiwan.
CANADIAN PATROL SUBMARINE PROJECT (CPSP)
DND, as part of its CPSP competition process, is currently being presented with 5 SSK models for its new undersea fleet, including TKMS’s Type 212 CD, Hanwha Ocean’s KSS-III, Navantia’s S-80, Saab’s C-71 and the Naval Group’s Blacksword Barracuda. While all of these submarines are indeed impressive, there is one additional platform that should also be considered as well: the DNCS SMX Ocean-class SSK. It is basically the same design as the French Barracuda-class SSN, with no nuclear reactor but instead a high-performance air-independent propulsion (AIP) system equipped with second-generation fuel cells for a submerged endurance period of up to three weeks.
The conventionally powered sub also has a maximum diving depth of 350m and a very long patrol range of 18,000 nautical miles at 14 knots with a patrol cruise of 90 days, all of which are capabilities vital for a potential war against China across the vast expanses of the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, the attack boat has a X rudder for increased manoeuvrability and a pumpjet which is a shrouded propulsive propeller for reducing cavitation noise, allowing the sub to maintain speeds of 20 knots, while remaining virtually undetectable on sonar. In doing so, the combination of the pumpjet and the AIP system gives the DNCS SMX Ocean-class SSK advanced submarine-hunting capabilities, allowing it to effectively find and destroy Chinese SSNs and SSKs in the East China Sea, Philippine Sea, and Luzon Strait to help disrupt any successful PLAN blockade of Taiwan. Such a capability would also seamlessly complement the RCN’s likely contribution of ASW-specialized Halifax-class frigates which are equipped with 24 ship-launched Mk-46 torpedoes as well as ASW CH-148 Cyclone helicopters.
Regardless of which option the RCN chooses, new Canadian submarines will be essential in assisting US naval forces in the Indo-Pacific.
AERIAL REFUELLING SUPPORT
However, while nuclear attack and cruise missile submarines are highly effective power projection assets in contested environments, they would not be the only survivable deep-strike platforms that the US would leverage to dismantle China’s A2/AD apparatus. Long-range stealth bombers, like the B-21 and B-2, represent another viable option to penetrate PLA defences and engage targets effectively, thereby maintaining the credibility of US conventional deterrence. Having said that, to fully utilize their stealth capabilities and enable scalable precision strike operations at extended ranges, these aerial assets would require increased fuel capacity provided by America’s air-to-air tanker fleet. Tankers, therefore, are major force multipliers and play a vital role in providing the necessary fuel for heavy bombers to significantly extend their operational endurance and strike range. However, in a potential conflict with China, many of these strategic assets would likely be tasked with sustaining tactical counter-air aircraft as well as maritime attack aircraft to deny the PLAAF air superiority over Taiwan and weaken the PLAN invasion fleet as much as possible. As a result, the USAF could potentially face a shortage of tankers. This is an area where Canada could potentially assist America’s forces. Despite the CAF currently lacking combat credible submarines to be of any assistance in defending Taiwan, they do possess a respectable fleet of tankers, capable of supporting tactical and strategic aircraft, like the B-21 or B-2. These bombers, in a war with China, could be refuelled by the RCAF’s CC-330 Husky tankers while allied fighter jets could be topped off by Canadian CC-130 Hercules and CC-150 Polaris aircraft.
ADDITIONAL AIRLIFT & STAND-OFF STRIKE CAPACITY
This shortfall in aerial refuelling, however, unfortunately extends to other areas of US combat logistics, including strategic airlift and replenishment ships. While American mobility and supply capabilities are still formidable and far superior to those of any other country, they are gradually dwindling and aging. This reality presents a serious problem as the US military’s new operational concepts of dynamic basing, distributed operations, and littoral maneuver and littoral warfare in the Indo-Pacific have significantly elevated the need for intra-theatre lift. Whereas yesterday’s large-scale deployment for Operation Desert Storm allowed time to systematically mobilize forces, the speed and expanse of a potential Indo-Pacific conflict would not and instead require velocity at scale. The central role of mobility and logistics in enhancing and sustaining joint force lethality against the PLA cannot be overstated. Similar to aerial refuelling, Canada could also aid the USAF’s logistic and strategic airlift efforts with its current modest contingent of 22 CC-177s and CC-130s and in the future procure more of these aircraft to support America’s Air Mobility Command. These assets would allow the CAF to quickly transport Canadian and US troops, supplies, and ammunition between forward expeditionary advanced bases, forward arming and refuelling points, anti-ship missile bases, and observation posts within the ‘first island chain’.
As an additional bonus, these strategic airlift aircraft could also further help augment America’s long range standoff strike capabilities and the USAF’s bomber force by temporarily being repurposed to be standoff bombers capable of carrying new palletized, configurable, and disposable weapons modules, known as the Rapid Dragon Palletized Effects System, which are airdropped in order to deploy up to 45 flying munitions, typically cruise missiles. Such munitions include AGM-158 JASSM-ERs and LRASMs which can be mass launched in long range strikes against vital land and maritime targets 1,200 miles away. More importantly, future development will also generalize the system beyond the AGM-158 missile family to include JDAM-ER bombs, sea mines, drones, and other missile systems. Consequently, given the operational flexibility and overwhelming lethality of the Rapid Dragon Palletized Effects System, Ottawa should purchase large numbers of these weapons modules along with the necessary stand-off munitions to stock them. This acquisition would enable the RCAF to play a critical anti-ship role in the early days of a war with China and help prevent the PLAN from gaining dominance in the East and South China Sea area, thereby buying time for US and allied air and naval assets to deploy to the region.
EXTRA REPLENISHMENT SHIPS
Lastly, in terms of combat logistics, with the US Navy only possessing 29 replenishment ships for a fleet of 300 deployable warships, America needs all the help it can get to overcome the ‘tyranny of distance’ in a potential war with China over Taiwan. Additional oilers and supply ships would be critical to keeping the US Navy’s warships moving and on station in the region for longer periods of time to sustain offensive operations. With two Joint Support Ships currently being constructed under the National Shipbuilding Strategy and the RCN’s CSS Asterix in active service, Canada could possibly contribute two replenishment ships to the coalition effort. However, given the massive scale of a potential US-China conflict, Ottawa should acquire two additional JSSs and one more converted replenishment ship, similar to what it did with Project Resolve, during which it purchased a relatively cheap commercial container ship from Germany and converted it into an auxiliary vessel/supply ship for the RCN. It is now leased to the navy with a merchant navy crew complemented by RCN personnel and is capable of carrying 400 tonnes of fresh water, 10.5 million litres of marine fuel, and 1.3 million litres of aviation fuel. These procurements, altogether, would result in Canada having a fleet of 6 supply ships, thereby giving the RCN the capacity to support coalition forces with 3-4 combat logistic ships and help allied warships refuel, rearm, and restock on food and supplies at sea, and therefore stay in combat for an extended period of time without having to return to a friendly port.
MINE HUNTING ASSISTANCE
Having said that, in any conflict with China, these large oil-laden ships along with the RCN’s and coalition’s capital warships would undoubtedly be highly vulnerable against Chinese sea mines. Offensive mining has long been a fundamental element of the PLAN’s capabilities and has traditionally played a prominent role in PLAN naval doctrine. China has an estimated arsenal of 50,000–100,000 maritime mines with only Russia having more. In a hypothetical Taiwan invasion scenario, China could use offensive mining to help blockade the island nation and delay the interventions of the US and its allies. The PLA would also likely leverage offensive mining to seal off key American naval ports in the Indo-Pacific region, such as those in Japan or Guam. These potential threats pose a serious problem for the US Navy as despite the formidable size and firepower of its overall fleet, it lacks a sufficient force of mine countermeasures vessels.
Fortunately, though, Canada has a relatively robust minesweeper fleet with 12 Kingston-class coastal defence vessels and could possibly help America’s naval forces in this area. The RCN is also in the process of replacing these ships with new, more advanced Vigilance Offshore Patrol Vessels, fully equipped with minesweeping and mine hunting modules. However, given the extent of China’s arsenal of maritime mines, Ottawa should continue to acquire more mine hunting equipment and mine countermeasures. Such technologies include Airborne Laser Mine Detection Systems and Airborne Mine Neutralization Systems which can be installed on Canada’s current fleet of Cyclone helicopters, to detect, classify and rapidly provide accurate target geo-location information of floating and near-surface moored mines to support the follow-on destruction of those mines. Furthermore, the RCN could also procure Common Unmanned Surface Vehicles (CUSV) from Textron Systems which specialize in minesweeping and are equipped with Raytheon’s AN/AQS-20 and Northrop Grumman’s AN/AQS-24 sonars to help the US Navy address this critical capability gap.
BMD CAPABILITY GAP
Last, but not least, the CAF must also be ready to assist allied forces in the areas of ballistic missile defence and air base defence. This capability is critical given the PLARF’s massive arsenal of short- and medium-range munitions and the fact that in the event of a Taiwan invasion, Beijing would almost certainly initiate an overwhelming conventional ‘first strike’ against all forward deployed allied forces in the Western Pacific to completely eliminate any potential for a US-led foreign intervention, allowing its amphibious assault to proceed unimpeded. Consequently, to help deter and, if necessary, defend against such a saturation attack, the RCN, from a force design perspective, must procure 4 Flight III Arleigh-Burke class destroyers from the US as these vessels are arguably the most advanced and heavily armed air defence warships in the world and far more capable than Canada’s planned River-class surface combatants.
Outfitted with mature, combat proven AN/SPY-6 (V)1 Air and Missile Defence Radar systems, a track capacity of well over 100 targets, and 96 missile-firing Mark 41 VLS cells, each of these destroyers could effectively defend US carrier strike groups and allied air bases against Chinese attacks, using SM-3 mid-course interceptors to destroy DF-21 and DF-26 ballistic missiles prior to reentry into the atmosphere and SM-6 surface-to-air missiles for terminal-phase interceptions of hypersonic glide vehicle threats such as the DF-17. By contrast, the RCN’s future River-class surface combatant is only armed with 32 SM-2 Block IIICs and ESSMs, both of which are not suitable for BMD. The American warship’s Aegis Combat System and SPY-6 radar could also easily provide additional air defence against incoming PLAAF aircraft or anti-ship cruise missiles by leveraging ESSMs, SM-2ERs, and CIWSs.
F-35 CONTRIBUTION
Beyond mobile, sea-based air and missile defence platforms, however, Canada’s contribution to BMD and air base defence could also include its fighter jets. One only has to look at the ongoing war in Ukraine or America’s recent defence of Israel against Iran’s massive ballistic missile and drone swarm attack to see that fighter jets, if used properly, can effectively complement ground-based air defences to detect, track, and eliminate incoming aerial threats. While any RCAF contribution in terms of manned combat aircraft would be quite limited as of right now as the service at best can only muster a mere 36 combat credible CF-18 Hornets, fully equipped with contemporary-standard AESA (active electronically scanned array) radars, its future holds some promise, especially given Ottawa’s recent purchase of 88 Block 4 F-35As.
The eventual deployment of this newest version of the fifth-generation aircraft would provide Canadian fighter pilots with new, enhanced ISR capabilities, greater battle space situational awareness, and better survivability in high-threat operational environments such as China’s A2/AD zones within the ‘first island chain’ due to its formidable stealth and sensing capabilities. More importantly, in the event of an armed conflict with the PLA, these RCAF jets would be able to exploit their interoperability with other allied F-35s and fuse and share all of their radar and sensor data with them, thereby updating the common operational picture of the Joint Force, tasked with defending Taiwan. Additionally, with their new ‘Sidekick’ weapons bay adapters, Canada’s new fighter jets will have an increased weapons payload of 6 AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) for conducting defensive counter-air missions and combat air patrols against the PLAAF. Such a capability is crucial for not only augmenting the ground- and sea-based air defences of US forward bases and aircraft carriers, but also allowing USAF and USN tactical aircraft to focus more on executing maritime interdiction operations against China’s invasion fleet and high-speed precision strikes against time-sensitive high-value ground targets on the Chinese mainland, including PLA ballistic and cruise missile launchers, C2 centres, and air and missile defence nodes.
Furthermore, with the acquisition of new JSMs, JSOWs, Stand-In Attack Weapons, and in the future, Mako hypersonic missiles, Canada’s F-35As could also effectively contribute to a counter-A2/AD campaign in any potential conflict while simultaneously providing additional advanced electronic warfare capacity. Consequently, given these immense capabilities and the formidable threat environment in the Indo-Pacific, Ottawa should consider doubling down on its force reconstitution efforts and purchase an extra squadron of 12 short take-off and vertical-landing (STOVL) F-35Bs which are arguably more suitable for the vast, remote island-filled maritime region. They can operate from austere bases and an array of light aircraft carriers while they can also take off and land from longer runways and conventional bases.
MORE PROMISES, BUT LIKELY SAME RESULT
Overall, while the likelihood of Ottawa following through on all or even the majority of these procurement proposals is virtually nil, it is imperative that the federal government makes every effort to significantly increase defence spending and transform the Canadian military into a highly modernized expeditionary force, capable of helping its allies defend Taiwan, as hard power seems to be the only form of national strength that China recognizes and respects.
Having said that, this past year has seen significant defence and security challenges for Canada and, by extension, the CAF. From the 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy to DND’s recent Defence Policy Update, ‘Our North, Strong and Free,’ to announcements on NORAD modernization, Canada is indeed trying to fulfill its international security commitments and restore its military to its once formidable and respectable status; but these force recapitalization efforts are decades away from being turned into real capabilities and the security environment in the Indo-Pacific can shift very quickly at any moment. Operational readiness across all three service branches also remains a major concern along with effective military procurement and improvements in the recruitment and retention of CAF personnel.
Canada through successive governments has rendered itself largely strategically irrelevant to its allies on a military basis in the region and perhaps this is why Canada has not been approached by or offered to join the QUAD of India, Australia, Japan, and the United States and was ignored by Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States with regards to AUKUS. In the end, Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is a communications strategy to hide weakness at home and abroad and the lack of a national commitment to international security in a region of vital economic interest.
Richard Nghiem is a Regular CDR Contributor
