This is CDR’s third installment in a series of articles focused on modernizing the forces. The first article focused on the Army, while the second focused on the Air Force. Now, as part of our special navy themed issue, we are turning our attention towards the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). We’ve asked writer, Richard Nghiem, to look at some ‘out-of-the-box’ ideas on how the RCN can return to a true ‘blue-water’ navy as quickly as possible. Here is our report.

Major delays in military procurement over the past two decades mean that, today, the RCN is less militarily capable than at any point since the end of the Cold War. The service’s highly touted Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) project, intended to replace the Nation’s 12 existing Halifax-class frigates, is $58 billion over budget and 10 years behind schedule. The first completed CSC was originally to be delivered in the early 2020s. However, in 2021, Canada’s Department of National Defence (DND) admitted that the delivery of the first vessel wouldn’t take place until 2030 or 2031.

The project has already faced significant increases in cost from the original estimated price tag of $26 billion. Parliamentary Budget Officer, Yves Giroux, now estimates the cost of the ships to be around $84 billion – more than triple the original projected price tag. As a result, Canada has no choice but to operate its current frigates beyond their 30-year lifespan with some ships of the class anticipated to be in service until the 2040s.

Meanwhile its fleet of replenishment ships has been scaled down to a single ship and as such, the RCN lacks the ability to independently sustain deployed task group operations. Additionally, Ottawa is in need of command and control and ballistic missile defence destroyers that are critical for both area-air defence and integrated air and missile defence missions.

More importantly, though, the RCN is woefully ill-equipped to carry out large-scale offensive operations, particularly in contested A2/AD environments. The service’s current Halifax-class frigates, the mainstay of its surface fleet, possess zero Vertical Launching System (VLS) cells, are only armed with a limited number of above-deck missile launchers, and are equipped with radars that, by today’s standards, are obsolete. The RCN also doesn’t field much in the way of amphibious capability and possesses no specialist air defence vessels—two areas which are crucial in conventional naval combat.

Simply put, Canada’s maritime force is on the verge of becoming completely irrelevant as it is unable to credibly defend the Nation’s sovereignty and protect its interests at sea.

Therefore, the ultimate question for Ottawa is: What new measures does DND need to take to properly modernize the fleet in a timely manner?

NSS

In 2010 the federal government introduced the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS). The original plan included two major yards, one on each coast, to build ships for the RCN and the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), and create thousands of jobs in the process. Irving Shipbuilding in Halifax was contracted to build 15 CSCs and 6 AOPS, while Seaspan in Vancouver was to construct ships for the CCG and 2 Joint Support Ships (JSS) for the RCN. In April 2023, PM Trudeau announced that Chantier Davie of Lévis, Quebec, would become the third strategic partner under the NSS. This included the construction of 6 program icebreakers and one polar icebreaker for the CCG.

The NSS was established in an attempt to bring predictability to federal vessel procurement and was designed to eliminate the boom-and-bust cycles of vessel procurement that slowed down Canadian shipbuilding in the past. Essentially, this meant building a domestic shipbuilding industry from the ground up. Well, it can be argued that Canada accomplished what it set out to do. The transformation seen at all three shipyards – Irving, Seaspan and Davie – is remarkable. Perhaps even more impressively, the NSS has been able to support the rebirth of the greater marine industry and associated supply chains. There are many Canadian companies that are now seeing demand for their products on the international market. Companies like OSI Maritime Systems have benefited from NSS work as it has created credibility for the company in the international arena. If your home country is buying your products, it’s a lot easier to sell them abroad.

OFF-THE-SHELF PROCUREMENT

While the reasons behind the creation of the NSS are admirable, Canada cannot continue to ignore the glaring problems – especially when it comes to the CSC. “A flawed and disastrous procurement process underlying the NSS has turned a noble vision into an unmitigated financial debacle,” said Alan Williams, a former ADM (MAT) at DND, during a previous interview with CDR. In order to modernize the RCN and protect Canadian sovereignty, Ottawa needs to seriously consider more “off-the-shelf” procurement.

The CSC project has already wasted countless taxpayer dollars and has encountered significant delays. Unfortunately, though, these facts do not seem to matter as successive federal governments have failed to take an “off-the-shelf” procurement approach, even when it makes sense. Instead, more emphasis is placed on jobs and political capital over national security, and the end result has been the rapid atrophy of Canada’s fleet. Ultimately, if Ottawa is to properly rebuild and recapitalize the navy in a timely manner, its main focus must be on ensuring that the acquisition process is not influenced by political pressure or the demand for domestic jobs. This shift in emphasis will expedite procurement, enhance the RCN’s interoperability with allies, and ensure that the combat effectiveness of Canada’s maritime force is not compromised. 

Putting this newperspective on procurement into practice, DND should cap construction of the Type 26 fleet at three ships. This argument is supported by many industry experts, including Alan Williams. At this point, it is too late to completely cancel the River-class destroyer project, for two main reasons. The first is that too much time and money has already been invested into the program. The other reason is that the US has already approved a Foreign Military Sale to Canada of Aegis Combat System shipsets, AN/SPY-7 radars, along with Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) hardware and Mk 41 VLSs. Furthermore, the construction process on the first batch of three CSCs has already commenced.

Instead of producing 15 CSCs, DND should immediately consider the purchase of 4 proven and tested Flight III Arleigh Burke-class destroyers from the US and cheap “off-the-shelf” surface combatants such as the US’ Constellation-class frigates or Japan’s Mogami-class frigates. These platforms will not only restore a maritime area air defence capability to the RCN but will also give the service a new ballistic missile defence capability and more missile firepower at a cheaper cost-per-ship.

This reduction in program size with regards to the CSC and purchase of alternative ships from the US or Japan makes sense for a number of reasons. First, both the US Navy and the JMSDF have already spent the time and money researching, engineering, and developing their own respective ships’ designs and are currently constructing them. Furthermore, these foreign nations’ shipbuilding industries are far more robust than Canada’s and have the capacity to deliver 15 of these surface combatants in just 5 years. Given this incredibly fast projected build rate, buying these ships right off the shelf would save Canada tens of billions of dollars and expedite the modernization of its fleet.

The cost savings cannot be ignored. While the original budget for the CSC was projected to be only $26 billion, numerous industry sources now suggest that the acquisition and construction cost of these ships is actually closer to $84 billion. Not only that, the delivery timeline of the River-class destroyer fleet has inconceivably slipped by not years, but decades. The first vessels, including the HMCS Fraser, will be delivered in the early 2030s with the final ship scheduled to arrive by 2050. An additional two to three years of tests and sea trials will also be necessary before the ships can officially deploy. This major setback could not have occurred at a worse time as the RCN’s existing Halifax-class frigates are already at the end of their 30-year lifespan.  

Lastly, but most importantly, contrary to Ottawa’s mandate of a 15-frigate navy, the RCN will in all likelihood need more combat ships than that to adequately protect the country’s vast coastlines, especially in the Arctic. According to many naval experts, it will take a minimum of 18 surface combatants to allow Canada to effectively defend its coast, protect its air space, and secure maritime domain awareness by having two ships at high readiness on each coast, rather than just one. Maintaining this level of combat capacity will not only enable the RCN to fulfill its NORAD and NATO obligations, but also allow Ottawa to contribute to stronger bilateral relations with the United States, which is of the utmost importance right now, given Washington’s increasing frustration with Canada’s lack of defence spending.

Unfortunately, though, in recent weeks, it has become increasingly clear that one of the possible “off-the-shelf” frigates that the Navy could have pursued is no longer a viable option for Canada. The US’ Constellation-class frigate, while a cheaper and equally advanced version of the CSC, is now on track to run as much as three years late in terms of construction. Weighed down by workforce recruitment issues and design maturity challenges, the program may not deliver its first hull until 2029.

As a result, it is imperative that Canada consider other viable alternatives: Japan’s Mogami-class frigate and the United-States’ Flight III Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.

MOGAMI-CLASS FRIGATE

The Mogami-class frigate provides an intriguing mix of extreme automation, stealth, robust combat capabilities and low cost. It is capable of everything from surveillance to minesweeping operations as well as anti-surface, anti-air, and anti-submarine warfare. These ships also feature advanced electronic warfare and sensor suites. But above all else, they are designed to be operated by remarkably small crews. In essence, they can help a navy to do far more with far less.

In terms of armament, each frigateis armed with a BAE Systems’ Mark 45 5-inch naval gun system, alongside two 12.7mm remote weapon systems. These platforms, during close-range encounters, can be directed by the ship’s radar to engage both air and sea targets. Mogami-class vessels also boast Lockheed Martin’s 16-cell Mk 41 VLS for launching Type 03 Chu-SAM surface-to-air missiles, which are equipped with active AESA radar homing seekers, to counter increasingly complex anti-surface missile threats such as Chinese YJ-12s.

Besides being well protected against air and missile attack, these warships are also highly competent in anti-surface and undersea warfare. With regards to the former, they are armed with eight Type 12 anti-ship missiles, each equipped with a powerful 250kg warhead. As a result, in a potential confrontation with Russia in the Arctic or showdown with China in the Western Pacific, this surface combatant, if procured by the RCN, could serve as a credible deterrent to Russia’s prized Gorshkov-class frigates or China’s Type 055 Renhai-class cruisers.

Shifting to the undersea domain, a realm that is especially important to Canada, Mogami-class frigates, due to their multi-mission purpose design, are also highly capable. They feature a towed array sonar system, a variable depth sonar, three twin-Type 12 light-weight torpedo launchers, Type 07 anti-submarine missiles as well as an SH-60 Seahawk helicopter. The Mogami-class’ undersea capabilities, however, are not limited to ASW and extend to both mine-laying and minesweeping. These frigates possess sea mines along with mine-laying equipment and are capable of deploying and recovering two OZZ-5 uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUV), and two Umikaze uncrewed surface vehicles (USV) which can detect, identify, and disable mines.

Lastly, but most importantly, the Mogami-class’ biggest and most unique trademark is its extreme automation paired with a small crew size, a characteristic that may be extremely beneficial for Canada given the size of its Navy. While a current Halifax-class frigate or future CSC typically requires a complement of around 225 sailors, a Mogami-class frigate is designed to be operated by a crew of just 90. This is remarkably small for such a large naval platform and is only possible due to high levels of automation and computerization throughout the vessel.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       

As a result, with such a small minimum crew requirement, the Mogami-class frigate arguably offers the RCN a unique solution to its current readiness and personnel crisis. In its present critical state, the service is unable to sufficiently staff, maintain and operate its aging surface combatant ships due to recruiting shortfalls. This manpower issue, consequently, has forced the Navy to prioritize operating its 12 Halifax-class multi-role patrol frigates at the cost of deploying its 12 Kingston-class Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs). Not only that, the RCN is now incapable of deploying more than one of its Harry DeWolf–class offshore patrol vessels at a time, despite having four in the fleet and two more on the way. However, if the RCN were to cap its CSC program at three vessels and instead immediately procure Mogami-class frigates to be the backbone of its surface fleet, it would be in a much better position to redistribute and redeploy its personnel, maximizing the lethality of its limited force.

In addition to being a solid and logical choice for the RCN from an operational point of view, the Mogami-class also makes sense from an economic perspective. Recent estimates suggest procurement costs to be around the low $300 million range which is substantially less than a CSC for roughly the same combat capabilities. Not only that, with the Mogami-class’ high level of automation, savings in through-life costs are projected to be very high as well. Finally, and equally as important, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is currently constructing these ships at a staggering rate of 3 per year and is on schedule to deliver 12 new Mogami-class frigates to the JMSDF from 2024 to 2028. This kind of production capacity and efficiency is exactly what Ottawa requires right now as the Nation’s fleet is rapidly deteriorating and desperately needs new ships.

ARLEIGH BURKE-CLASS DESTROYERS

While the Mogami-class frigate is arguably the perfect backbone for Canada’s maritime force, there is no question that a specialized air and missile defence vessel is still needed to properly round out the fleet. As a result, the RCN must also procure 4 Flight III Arleigh Burke-class destroyers from the US as these ships are some of the most advanced and heavily armed warships in the world and far more capable than Canada’s planned River-class destroyers. In terms of sensors and processing systems, they are equipped with the upgraded Aegis Baseline 10 Combat System, a state-of-the art SPY-6(V)1 Air and Missile Defense Radar, the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, along with a unique Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC).

But, out of all the sophisticated aforementioned technologies that this warship boasts, the true cornerstone system of this ship is undisputedly its AN/SPY-6 (V)1 Air and Missile Defense Radar system. This 4-sided phased array radar, each with 37 radar modular assemblies (RMAs), for a total of 148 RMAs, places a massive emphasis on “scalability” and the ability to utilize different numbers of RMAs to determine at what range objects can be detected and how small a threat can be seen. Put in other words, by scaling the sensitivity and power of the radar, one can significantly increase detection ranges, observe smaller objects, and monitor larger numbers of potential threats simultaneously. This radar, consequently, has been reported to be able to identify and track over 30 times the number of targets than existing SPY-1 radars on most US Navy ships can handle, allowing it to counter large and complex saturation attacks, consisting of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial threats. Not only that, it can detect enemy objects and threats half the size at twice the distance as previous radars can. This capability is vital, given that the ranges of Chinese and Russian weapons and sensors, coupled together with multi-domain networking, have put into question the survivability of surface warships.

Canadian defence experts, nonetheless, will undoubtedly be quick to point out that Ottawa’s projected CSCs are equipped with an even better radar system: the AN/SPY-7(V)3. Unfortunately, this is not the case as one thing to note about the SPY-7 radars that will be aboard the RCN’s River-class destroyers is that these systems will actually be less capable than the SPY-6 radar on board Flight III Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. This is because their size is considerably smaller in terms of number of RMAs. Dimensionally, the CSC cannot accommodate a much larger array of modules and fit a bigger power supply as well. As a result, while the SPY-6(V)1 aboard Flight IIIs consist of 148 RMAs, the SPY-7(V)1 that will go on Canada’s new warships will only use 36.

In addition to having an arguably better radar system, Arleigh Burke-class destroyers also have the edge in being able to quickly close ‘kill chains’ and conduct ballistic missile defence (BMD) operations. Their AN/SPY-6 radars are directly integrated with their upgraded Aegis Baseline 10 Combat Systems and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Systems, allowing for more precise threat data to not only arrive at a faster pace from greater distances, but also with greater fidelity. Additionally, these ships’ CEC allows them to receive and combine information from multiple forward-deployed air and naval sensors on CEC-equipped units, including those from other allied navies, into a single, real-time defence composite track picture. This fusion of sensors with fire-control technologies and formation of a common operating picture is crucial as in the event of a large-scale attack, SPY-6 radar systems of multiple Flight III Arleigh Burke-class destroyers can detect, track and quickly provide advanced discrimination data regarding incoming ballistic missile threats to both the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System and Aegis Baseline 10 Combat System, shortening the sensor-to-shooter ‘kill chain’.

As a result, these integrated naval weapon systems, with a track capacity of well over 100 targets, can quickly and effectively engage hostile targets, using SM-3 mid-course interceptors to destroy ballistic missiles prior to reentry into the atmosphere, and SM-2 and SM-6 surface-to-air missiles for terminal-phase interceptions. The Aegis Combat System in conjunction with the SPY-6 radar can also easily provide Arleigh Burke-class destroyers with adequate air defence against incoming enemy aircraft or anti-ship missiles with ESSMs and SM-2s. However, these warships are not limited to just kinetic defences as they can also conduct non-kinetic warfare to eliminate a wide range of aerial threats. For example, their SPY-6 radars are capable of using their AESA antenna along with tightly directed beams of high-powered radio waves to electronically blind enemy aircraft and incoming missiles.

Most importantly, though, from a procurement and modernization point of view, while the River-class surface combatant and Arleigh Burke-class destroyer are approximately the same in size and displacement, in terms of actual air defence payloads, the latter is vastly superior with 96 missile-firing Mark 41 VLS cells as opposed to the CSC’s 32 cells. Furthermore, the American warship is capable of launching a much wider range of surface-to-air munitions, compared to that of the RCN’s planned River-class surface combatants. These include SM-2 ERs, ESSMs, highly versatile SM-6 missiles which can protect high-value assets against hypersonic threats, and SM-3s which are designed to intercept ballistic missiles in outer space prior to re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere. By contrast, the CSC is only armed with SM-2 Block IIICs and ESSMs, both of which are not suitable for BMD.

Altogether, Flight III Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are precisely the specialist air defence vessels that Canada needs to counter a multi-pronged, coordinated enemy attack involving a mix of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial assets. With their advanced AN/SPY-6 radars, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Systems, unique CEC, and extensive missile magazines, these ships, if procured, would effectively protect Canadian airspace and provide potent air defence for all deployed naval task groups. Most importantly, though, the purchase of these warships would enable the Navy to greatly enhance its contribution to NORAD and boost its ability to defend Canadian cities from Russian ballistic missile attack.

OVERHAULING THE AOPS

Besides new multi-mission frigates and air defence destroyers for its Atlantic and Pacific fleets, Ottawa also needs a greater presence in the Arctic. This entails better armed, icebreaking patrol ships, capable of not only operating in the harsh weather conditions of the Far North, but also providing a credible deterrent to defend Canadian sovereignty. To meet this strategic demand, current Harry DeWolf-class offshore patrol ship construction should be immediately halted while naval engineers and designers quickly try to modify the ships’ combat systems and integrate more weapon platforms aboard these vessels. This is absolutely necessary due to the fact that these warships, meant to patrol the Far North, have very limited offensive weapons. While they do show Russia that Canada is present in the Arctic, they are mainly symbolic as they cannot defend themselves and enforce the Nation’s coastlines with force. In terms of armament, they are only equipped with a 25mm gun, a couple M2 heavy machine guns, and a single Cyclone helicopter.Some defence analysts, consequently, have argued that such an undertaking would cost too much money and take too much time. Nonetheless, it is absolutely imperative as an underarmed patrol ship is nothing more than a “road-paver”, allowing Russian frigates and destroyers to freely sail through the Arctic and into Canadian waters.

Therefore, to increase the overall lethality of the RCN’s Harry DeWolf-class offshore patrol ships, combat systems such as Naval Strike Missile launchers, SeaRAM self-defence weapon systems, and 5-inch naval guns should be incorporated into each and every one of these vessels. Not only that, highly adaptable Mk 70 containerized launch platforms that can be operated with a variety of radars and add-on sensor systems, along with decked-mounted angled launchers, known as Adaptable Deck Launching Systems, should also be placed on the rear flight decks of these ships and properly leveraged. Both of these payload delivery systems comprise of Mk 41 VLS cells and can be utilized to fire a variety of offensive and defensive missiles. These munitions include multi-mission capable SM-6s, SM-2s, LRASMs, and TLAMs. In general, such a redesign or retooling effort is by no means impossible as America’s integration of Naval Strike Missiles and Mk 70-series containerized weapon systems onto its Independence-class Littoral Combat ships only took a matter of months. What is difficult, however, is gaining the necessary political will.

Lastly, if possible, the RCN should also consider procuring an additional Harry DeWolf-class offshore patrol ship which can serve as a potential Landing Helicopter Dock/Assault (LHD/LHA) vessel. This acquisition would enable Ottawa to not only have a credible strategic sealift capability, but also more effectively conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations at home and abroad. From a geopolitical perspective, such a purchase could have considerable appeal to a country like Canada that wishes to renew its presence on the world stage as a middle power. All in all, the service would be well positioned to support joint operations ashore while still preserving its ability to defend Canada’s sovereignty in the maritime domain.

MORE REPLENISHMENT SHIPS

However, modernizing Canada’s navy to safeguard the Nation’s Arctic claims requires more than just new frigates, destroyers, and patrol ships. It also requires additional replenishment ships as these vessels need enormous amounts of fuel and food stocks to be able to get to the Arctic and patrol its vast expanses. While DND is currently building a Protecteur–class auxiliary vessel as part of its two-vessel Joint Support Ship Project, Canada will definitely need more replenishment ships to fully support its new larger surface combatant fleet. As such, Canada should consider building an additional JSS with Seaspan.

However, due to the high-cost of these replenishment ships, Canada should also purchase a relatively cheap commercial container ship and convert it into an auxiliary vessel. The effectiveness of this concept was demonstrated by MV Asterix. The MV Asterix was purchased by Federal Fleet Services from Germany as part of Project Resolve and was later converted into a supply ship for the RCN. It was intended to act as an interim replacement between the out of service Protecteur–class replenishment oiler and the future Protecteur-class auxiliary vessel. The ship was converted and delivered to the RCN in December 2017 and is now leased to the navy with a merchant navy crew complemented by RCN personnel. Asterix will be in Canadian service well into the 2020s and is capable of carrying 400 tonnes of fresh water, 10.5 million litres of marine fuel, and 1.3 million litres of aviation fuel. It was also modified to be able to be armed with three Phalanx CIWS for self-protection and to carry two to three Cyclone helicopters.

Consequently, the Government should aim to provide at least two support ships for the fleet in both oceans, allowing one to always be available for operations when the other is in refit/maintenance or if it is deployed elsewhere. With only two Joint Support Ships currently slated to be constructed under the National Shipbuilding Strategy, the Government should act to procure one additional JSS and one additional converted replenishment ship, similar to what it did with Project Resolve. This will provide Canada with a fleet of five supply ships – should they continue leasing the MV Asterix – thereby giving the RCN the capacity to support forces ashore and respond to humanitarian emergencies at home and abroad.

Such a capability is crucial as without a robust auxiliary fleet, Canada cannot effectively project power far from its shores or sustain its naval forces for lengthy deployments. This current glaring capability gap can be clearly seen today with the RCN being completely powerless and unable to deploy any frigates to help the US Navy patrol shipping lanes in the Red Sea and defend commercial cargo ships against Houthi missile and drone attacks.

MCDV REPLACEMENT

Having said that, while Ottawa must be able to fulfill its international maritime security obligations and unilaterally deploy blue-water naval task forces to protect Canada’s global interests, its main responsibility has always been to defend the Nation’s coastal waters. The Navy has long relied on its Kingston-class coastal defence vessels to achieve this objective, but with these ships now nearly 30 years old, the service desperately needs to expedite the replacement of these vessels. That is why a new Canadian Multi-Mission Corvette (CMC) project has been created by DND. While there are numerous replacement options to choose from, from a versatility and reliability point of view, one can make the argument that there are only two platforms that fully meet Canada’s needs: Vard Marine Inc.’s Vigilance Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) and France’s Vigilante CL65 Mk II OPV.

Specifically designed for the needs of the RCN’s future fleet, the former strikes the right balance between flexibility, adaptability, and size. It is not only equipped for high-tempo sovereignty missions, but also engineered for global deployment and forward basing abroad. Furthermore, in the future, it is expected that the Vigilance OPV will fulfill a variety of critical operational needs through the seamless integration of various cost effective CUBE^TM plug-and-play mission modules and payload handling systems, enabling core naval missions such as minesweeping, maritime interdiction, and surveillance operations. This adaptability is crucial as it ensures that this OPV remains future-proof and relevant regardless of the tasks assigned to it. For more information on the Vigilance OPV, turn to page 60.

However, the Vigilance OPV is not the only viable replacement option. The Vigilante CL65 Mk II OPV is another equally lethal and versatile multi-mission platform. In terms of weaponry, it is armed with a 40mm main gun, two remotely controlled weapon stations (up to 20mm), and a light surface-to-air or surface-to-surface missile system such as the new Mistral 3 system. It is also equipped with VTOL UAVs for ISR missions, USVs and UUVs for minesweeping operations, and a tactical utility helicopter for search and rescue (SAR). All in all, regardless of which vessel is chosen, Canada’s navy will unquestionably have a new, highly capable platform that can effectively train naval reservists and defend the Nation’s coastal waters.

A NEW SUBMARINE FORCE

Last, but not least, with the modernization of the surface fleet now fully addressed, as a result of all these aforementioned procurement projects, one must now focus on the country’s submarine force. The importance of the Nation’s undersea fleet cannot be overstated as

with the Arctic now rapidly melting, making a vast and sensitive region more accessible to hostile foreign actors that have growing military capabilities and regional ambitions, a robust underwater surveillance capability is unquestionably vital to our security and sovereignty.

To showcase the increasingly volatile and complex nature of the Far North, Canada’s Northwest Passage is already more accessible than ever before with competitors such as Russia and China seeking transportation and shipping routes, natural resources, critical minerals, and energy sources by maintaining a more frequent and permanent presence in the region. Their submarines are also exploring our Arctic waters along with the sea floor, probing our undersea infrastructure, and collecting intelligence for a potential future maritime conflict.

With this new reality, attention should now be paid to the potential requirements the RCN will demand of a new submarine fleet. Five key capability requirements are likely to be paramount and can be described as stealth, undisputed lethality, high underwater endurance, robust range, and Arctic deployability. The last two specifications are, in large part, driven by a desire to carry out Arctic patrols. Transiting to the north from CFB Halifax or CFB Esquimalt and having a meaningful amount of time on station would rule out all but the largest classes of diesel-electric submarines available on the international defence market that have the longest ranges. This requirement will also inevitably aid in Canada’s ability to increase its submarine presence in other key strategic areas around the world, like the Indo-Pacific. Finally, Canada’s new subs must be highly lethal, very quiet, able to operate for long periods of time underwater, and possess the ability to surface through thick ice to establish communications, launch missiles, or support ground operations.

Given the aforementioned requirements, there are a few options to choose from. As you will read in this issue’s cover story, the S-80 submarine from Navantia is a viable option for the RCN. Other options include the Type 212CD submarine from thyssenkrupp Marine Systems, the Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarines from Hanwha Ocean/HD Hyundai Heavy Industries and the advanced Expeditionary C-71 submarine from Saab/Damen Shipyards. These are likely Canada’s best options. These undersea platforms are large, advanced submarines that have significant interoperability with US systems, are capable of surfacing through ice and are highly lethal, armed with powerful anti-ship missiles, heavyweight torpedoes, and in the case of South Korea’s Dosan Ahn Changho-class subs, even ballistic missiles. The acquisition of any of the aforementioned submarines would also be a tangible example of Ottawa’s strategic commitment to the Indo-Pacific 2 years after it officially announced its new Indo-Pacific strategy in 2022.

On the whole, while the RCN has faced enormous challenges in maintaining the Victoria-class fleet over the past few decades, this should not dissuade Canada from pushing forward with its replacement. Submarines remain a key, instrumental part of naval warfare, and Canada must make significant investments in this area if it wants to adequately provide for the country’s maritime security. 

RETURN TO A ‘BLUE-WATER’ NAVY

All in all, while most Canadians are not aware of the increasing maritime threat Russia poses to the Nation and that the oceans have a direct impact on their daily lives, Ottawa must remain fully cognizant that Canada is, in every sense of the word, a “maritime nation.” Not only is it bounded by three oceans, but it also possesses the world’s largest coastline and depends enormously on maritime trade for its economic wealth.

Therefore, to meet defence and security challenges in the coming decades and ensure the Nation’s economic prosperity throughout the 21st century, it is imperative that Canada acquires and maintains a balanced, Arctic-capable, and globally deployable ‘blue water’ navy to protect its territorial waters and global interests. A fleet of newly procured multi-mission frigates, air defence destroyers, replenishment ships, patrol vessels, and submarines, would, without question, revitalize the RCN and enable Ottawa to not only defend Canada’s sovereignty, but also fulfill its security obligations to NORAD and NATO. The service would additionally be able to help better protect maritime trade, enforce international laws, and act as a highly-flexible instrument of Canadian foreign policy.

Most importantly, though, with an ongoing significant shift in naval warfare from low-intensity littoral operations back towards ‘blue-water’ counter-A2/AD operations, due to the rapid naval build-ups of Russia and China, a newly recapitalized RCN would be in a much better position to engage in deterrent operations, and, if all else fails, effectively wage war alongside its allies.

Richard Nghiem is a Regular CDR Contributor