Beyond the Shoreline: Why Canada Needs Amphibious Assault Ships

CAF MODERNIZATION

BY RICHARD NGHIEM

Since 2022, the world’s international security balance has been severely disrupted by several major armed conflicts and geopolitical shifts ranging from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine to Israel’s recent intense Twelve-Day War with Iran to Beijing’s increasingly overt leadership of an emerging ‘unholy alliance’ between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. These developments have not only precipitated the end of the post-Cold War order, defined by unchallenged U.S. unipolarity, but also led to increased strategic competition and uncertainty.

This renewed great power rivalry has seen numerous ‘dormant’ countries around the globe, such as Canada, in the last couple of years, rapidly move to bolster their defence spending and reinvigorate their military power. Having said that, when compared to its counterparts among G7 nations, the Canadian military is still by far the weakest. It has limited strategic sea lift and force projection capacity, no amphibious capability, an aging command and control (C2) system, and is incapable of both executing large-scale joint operations and sustaining offensive land operations without allied support.

CANADA’S RELEVANCE

This massive deficit in strategic capabilities and lack of contribution to international security has already proven to be highly problematic for Ottawa as it is now viewed by many countries as nothing more than an inconsequential geopolitical bystander and a ‘military free-rider’. To showcase this unfortunate reality, while Canada currently has ambitions to reattain its middle power status and become a prominent leader in NATO, it has largely been left out of many critical conversations and potential new partnerships with its close allies regarding defence and security matters, with its exclusion from the AUKUS defence pact between Australia, the UK, and the U.S. being the most recent high profile example.

Ottawa’s decades long neglect of its armed forces and continuous failure to meet NATO defence spending commitments have additionally not only generated growing political frustration among alliance members, but also come up as major grievances and topics of discussion during recent bilateral trade negotiations with Washington. The latter has contributed to economically painful trade tariffs being placed on Canada, significantly hindering the growth of numerous industries across the country. Ultimately, after taking all of these facts into account, it is clear that if Canada wants to remain relevant on the international security stage and be seen as a respectable defence partner, it must make the recapitalization of its military a top priority and, most importantly, acquire the capability to independently project and sustain combat power on a strategic scale via expeditionary warfare.

EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE

Expeditionary warfare, in the context of military strategy, refers to offensive operations conducted by troops deployed to a foreign territory, often far from established bases, and typically requiring extensive logistical support. It involves the rapid deployment of air and ground forces, capable of operating independently in distant theatres of operations, and prioritizes the comprehensive use of supporting air and naval elements, specifically amphibious assault ships. These maritime assets are key for power projection as they not only facilitate the rapid insertion of military units and combat equipment from sea to shore, but also manage the flow of supplies to landed troops to adequately sustain combat power on the battlefield.

Common features of this type of vessel include a large flight deck for helicopters or short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) fighter aircraft, extensive medical facilities, aircraft hangars, and a well deck for launching amphibious vehicles and landing crafts. Additionally, in terms of force projection capacity, these ships also have the ability to deploy up to 2,000 troops ashore by air and sea. Such a landing force, in the context of the Canadian Army, would be equal to a full-strength mechanized battle group and could potentially constitute a combat effective, self-sufficient expeditionary force that Ottawa could rely upon as a rapid response detachment in the event of a crisis.  

THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIP PROJECT

That said, these unique capabilities and assets provided by amphibious assault ships have long been known by Canada. In the early 2000’s, the Department of National Defence (DND) was already submitting proposals to the House of Commons for the procurement of such vessels. This idea came about as part of the development of the Joint Support Ship Project of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and the need to improve the strategic sealift and amphibious assault capacity of the Nation’s armed forces. However, while many of the aforementioned capabilities were to be included in the new projected Joint Support Ship, a separate, dedicated amphibious ship was still strongly desired by numerous high-ranking defence officials, including then Chief of the Defence Staff, Rick Hillier, resulting in the creation of the Amphibious Assault Ship Project.

The program envisioned a ship that could both carry and deploy large volumes of troops and combat equipment anywhere around the world, using both landing crafts and helicopters such as the CH-147 Chinook, and provide close air support to them in the face of armed opposition. The warship would also be able to support humanitarian and disaster relief operations with its large hospital on board, designed for treating combat casualties, and conduct noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) in rapidly destabilizing regions, using its air and amphibious assets.

In the end, however, the project unfortunately lost steam as the procurement and budget for the Navy’s Canadian Surface Combatants (CSC) – now called the River Class Destroyers (RCD) – and Joint Support Ships (JSS) were given priority. Due to over stretched resources, the potential to negatively impact the current national ship building program, and an upcoming federal election, Ottawa did not deem it prudent to acquire new additional capital-intensive vessels. The Amphibious Assault Ship Project, since then, has never been mentioned in any new defence policy updates, nor has it been discussed at the senior decision maker level.

POWER PROJECTION SHORTFALL

As a result, for the last two decades, the CAF has lacked the ability to strategically project power at a meaningful scale. During combat operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Libya, Ottawa had no choice but to primarily rely on its small fleet of CC-177 Globemasters and contract air and sealift to transport its forces into theatre. These armed interventions by Canada were consequently limited for the most part with the sole exception being its military deployment to Kandahar Province from 2006 to 2011, during which a steady force of 3,000 troops was maintained to execute counterinsurgency operations and train Afghan forces. In addition to combat missions, such shortfalls in logistics and power projection capabilities have also been particularly glaring during Non-Combatant Evacuation (NEO) operations, where Global Affairs Canada (GAC) and DND have had to repeatedly contract out civilian ships and aircraft to assist in evacuation operations of citizens and diplomatic personnel abroad. Given today’s rapidly deteriorating global security landscape, this level of reliance on private assets is completely untenable as Ottawa cannot afford a strategy of hope that commercial transportation or allies will always be ready and able to support the CAF in the event of a sudden conflict or emergency.

As an example, while the Canadian military currently relies on the use of chartered vessels to meet its requirement for the global transport of its equipment to theatres of operation, there are major limitations in the use of such ships. For one, chartered shipping can only deliver combat equipment and supplies to a permissive littoral environment. The port of arrival for the vessel therefore must be totally secure and possess the infrastructure necessary to off-load CAF personnel, materiel, stores, and ammunition. This poses a significant challenge for the military, as ships may need to dock at a neutral location that could be a significant distance from the actual theatre where Canadian troops will operate, forcing the Army to enter a conflict zone from a disadvantageous tactical position.

Furthermore, the regular practice of leasing commercial vessels to maintain a strategic sealift capability severely reduces the CAF’s ability to deploy rapidly. Although standing contracts exist between DND and chartered shipping companies, the Navy’s mobility requirements will always be in competition with domestic and international business demands placed on commercial shipping. The military, as a result, does not have control over the sealift assets it utilizes for transporting its personnel around the world nor the speed at which such assets can deploy its equipment into theatre.

THE AMPHIBIOUS SOLUTION

This critical logistics shortcoming ultimately can only be addressed if the RCN acquires its own dedicated robust amphibious capability. Such an endeavour would require the procurement of multiple amphibious assault ships as these vessels have the unique ability to sustain the rapid build up and projection of combat power anywhere around the world. If the Navy had one for both its Atlantic and Pacific fleets, it would permit a rapid response to multiple situations at the request of the Canadian government. From being able to embark a full mechanized battle group for independent expeditionary combat operations as well as Special Operations Forces (SOF) elements or smaller purpose-built combat teams for counterterrorism, special reconnaissance, and unconventional warfare to possessing all the necessary medical facilities to function as a forward-deployed hospital, these maritime platforms would significantly enhance the CAF’s overall combat potential by advancing the concept and execution of joint operations, expanding the Navy’s strategic sealift capacity, and increasing Ottawa’s ability to execute non-combatant and embassy evacuation operations as well as global humanitarian and disaster relief missions.

The acquisition of an amphibious capability would also enable the military to conduct joint forcible entry operations in contested littoral environments with ship-to-shore connectors, amphibious combat vehicles, and long-range assault tilt rotor aircraft, providing senior commanders with an array of options for securing a beachhead or airfield in order to establish a foothold in a theatre of operations as there would be no reliance on port infrastructure for the disembarkation of additional troops and equipment. Thus, the speed at which Canadian forces could deploy and enter combat zones would increase substantially.

Lastly, while the CAF possesses a respectable strategic airlift capability that offers speed and flexibility for deploying personnel to immediate crisis areas, strategic sealift is arguably, in most cases, the most important component of power projection. It is essential for moving large numbers of troops and heavy combat vehicles over long distances and is more cost-effective than airlift as amphibious assault ships can carry the equivalent of hundreds of flights of CC-177 and C-130J transport aircraft. Thus, the acquisition of amphibious assault ships would exponentially improve the Nation’s logistics and expeditionary warfare capacity and underpin the ability to deploy and sustain forces in distant theatres, making it a vital part of both military strategy and global presence. Overall, this ability to self-sufficiently deploy and support combat power at a strategic scale is a critical asset to have as it makes a clear statement to Canada’s allies and partners that Ottawa is capable of taking independent military action at home and abroad.

With that being said, the capacity of amphibious ships to also more cost-effectively “deliver across a wide spectrum of operations,” is just as important. This emphasis on multi-functionality is crucial as Canada does not have a large enough defence budget to procure platforms and systems that singularly focus on one specific mission or theatre. In other words, the appeal of the amphibious assault ship for Ottawa comes from its versatility that allows it to complete a broad range of tasks and have the adaptability to reconfigure for specific missions if required.

ENABLING JOINT OPERATIONS

For example, it can be argued that the CAF currently does not conduct joint operations as there is limited cooperation between the RCAF and the Canadian Army, and the RCAF and the RCN. Aside from joint fires and special operations, these integrations are typically small in scale, and without any tangible effect in the operating area. That said, the amphibious assault ship is more than just an ‘army shuttle bus’, but a joint platform that integrates forces from across the domains to have a rapid effect in littoral environments. The Command and Control (C2) systems onboard provide an extensive information infrastructure to support command support systems and provide C2 for the embarked force, on top of the typical suite of communications, radars, and integrated surveillance systems. It is due to this capability and adaptability that in heavily contested theatres, operational commanders can still exercise C2 from offshore, and the integrated force will receive the benefit of this integration of systems networked to deployed air, land, and maritime forces.

Additionally, the typical hospital on an amphibious assault ship has approximately 60 beds, which is sufficient, when combined with the Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) capabilities of integral air assets, for light to medium combat operations. These same air assets can also provide ISR, tactical lift, CAS, sustainment to landed forces, and conduct ASW and ASuW operations. Overall, having both combat service support, combat support and manoeuvre capabilities packaged in a self-protected offshore platform would allow the CAF to deploy, command, and sustain itself independently while bringing meaningful capabilities to the fight.

ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY

Amphibious assault ships, however, do not just enable joint forcible entry operations, but also bolster a nation’s ability to regularly enforce its sovereignty. With receding Arctic ice, contested territorial claims, increasing maritime traffic, and growing interest in northern transit routes, such a capability is of vital importance for Ottawa, particularly as it urgently seeks to project and sustain a more robust military presence in the Far North. Landing helicopter assault (LHAs) ships, leveraging their large vehicle bays, flight decks, and hangar space to deploy amphibious and airborne units, would be a premier tool for monitoring and responding to incidents in the region and constituting a new effective quick reaction force.

From being able to deploy all-terrain combat vehicles, snowmobiles, ASW helicopters, and cold weather-capable long-range assault aircraft to having Short Take-Off and Landing (STOL) logistics UASs, these amphibious assets would not only give Canadian ground forces the necessary time to set up expeditionary advanced bases throughout the Arctic and adequately resupply forward operational support hubs, but also facilitate large-scale joint air-ground assaults in austere areas to quickly seize and defend vital areas for follow-on military operations. These include close air support sorties, combat air patrols, and HIMARS fire missions which can be conducted to sustain effective A2/AD zones and to credibly defend Canadian territory, coastal areas, and sea lines of communication in the Far North.

Such potential new capabilities, consequently, make the procurement and incorporation of amphibious assault ships into the RCN a top priority as it would not only improve defence relations between Ottawa and Washington by demonstrating Canada’s willingness to finally take responsibility for its own security, but also significantly enhance the CAF’s ability to fulfill its obligations to NORAD and NATO.

PRESENCE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

And that is to say nothing of these platforms’ prospective contributions to the Nation’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy. The policy, which called for the Canadian military to play a greater role in the region, allocated additional funds to the Navy to sustain a forward presence of three frigates on an annual basis, significantly bolstering the service’s force posture. Having said that, this new security pledge is still far from sufficient, given the scale of the area of operations.

As a supplemental force, though, the additional deployment of an amphibious task group would undoubtedly send a stronger message towards Ottawa’s adversaries, particularly China, and provide a clear symbol of commitment to its Pacific allies and partners. The unique maritime and littoral combat capabilities of these ships would also provide the opportunity for increased partnership and training exercises to demonstrate solidarity while expanding and strengthening defence interoperability and relationships. To back this claim, Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS), air interceptions, Taiwan Strait transits, island retaking drills, along with ASW and ISR collection missions are just a few examples of tasks that Canadian amphibious vessels could be ordered to jointly carry out with allied navies to demonstrate Ottawa’s devotion to a free and open Indo-Pacific.

DISASTER RELIEF & HUMANITARIAN AID

Finally, in addition to enabling joint power projection, sovereignty, and enhanced forward presence operations, amphibious assault ships can also improve the Canadian government’s ability to rapidly respond to humanitarian and natural disasters across the globe. The platform is ideal for carrying out Humanitarian Assistance Response Training (HART), Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), or NEO operations, as it has the ability to transport numerous ship-to-shore connectors, utility aircraft, and large quantities of humanitarian stores, making it a ‘Swiss army knife’ for providing relief and exercising national soft power.

This mission flexibility and adaptability was clearly showcased during early 2016 when HMAS Canberra (an Australian Defence Force Amphibious Ship) responded to a typhoon in Fiji with 60 tonnes of humanitarian supplies, several search and rescue teams, and a complement of several hundred engineers, carpenters, electricians, and plumbers, all of whom were able to access even the most remote, severely hit areas of the archipelago, using the ship’s helicopters and landing craft. As a result, when disaster strikes at home or abroad, and the Canadian government is looking for options, an amphibious assault ship with an attached land component would arguably be the most comprehensive option, that could independently mobilize and deploy to have a tangible impact.

REVIVING THE 2005 AMPHIBIOUS
ASSAULT SHIP PROJECT

All in all, after taking into account these unique capabilities along with the world’s increasingly fragile security landscape, there is no question that policymakers in Ottawa should seriously consider reviving DND’s 20-year old shelved procurement plan for new amphibious assault ships. For this to happen, however, implementation, operating, and life-time maintenance costs for these maritime assets would need to be carefully studied and examined while secondary impacts to the rest of the CAF would also need to be addressed in an analysis as part of the Build Phase of The Defence Model and the Force Development System. The Navy would additionally need to attain a minimum base budget increase of $6 billion as well as a surge in end strength of approximately 2,000 personnel for two Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) amphibious assault ships to be integrated into the fleet.

With that said, though, the impact of operating these vessels would not be limited to just the Navy as the Army would also need to re-roll two infantry battalions and affiliated combat support elements to conduct amphibious training. These units would most likely come from the 1st and 5th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Groups, due to their proximity to the coasts. As a result, this capability may come at the expense of flexibility in the Army’s managed readiness plan.

In addition, the RCAF would similarly need to make changes to its existing fleet and conduct comprehensive reviews of its current procurement projects to ensure that its future aircraft will be able to support maritime operations. The current F-35 project and CH-146 replacement program, for example, could be amended to enable the acquisition of short take-off and vertical-landing (STOVL) F-35B fighter jets, stealthy VTOL-capable Bell V-280 tilt rotor aircraft, highly versatile autonomous V-247 UCAVs, and Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawks ASW helicopters. Such significant force design changes would provide the RCN with not only the lethality, mobility, and enhanced forward presence that is required to successfully operate, fight and win in a distributed maritime environment, but also the combat capabilities that are needed for power projection operations. Some of these valuable mission sets include long-range ISR-T, AEW, EW, ASuW, ASW, aerial refuelling, and fleet logistics. In summation, the decision to proceed with the procurement of a brand-new amphibious capability would likely result in a series of accommodations and impacts that would be shared across the military.

AMERICA-CLASS
AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIP

Nonetheless, such an acquisition is absolutely necessary as these new ships will help support the Joint Force across a wide spectrum of operations, from conducting amphibious and expeditionary missions of sea control and power projection to executing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions around the world. One specific platform that should be of particular interest to the RCN is the America-class amphibious assault ship.

It is capable of transporting and deploying an overstrength Canadian Army battle group along with its combat equipment and is configured to support air operations as the primary method for inserting light infantry units ashore. In terms of its complement, the ship has a standard crew of 65 officers as well as 994 enlisted personnel and can carry 1,687 troops, with surge capacity for an additional 184. Its aviation facilities are also optimized for air assault missions and can house a typical air wing of 12 MV-22B Osprey or V-280 Valor tilt-rotor aircraft, 10 F-35B Lightning II stealth fighters, and 9 V-247 Vigilant UASs or MH-60 helicopters. That said, the aircraft contingent can readily be adjusted depending on the task at hand. For example, the ship can alternatively carry up to 20 F-35Bs and 2 MH-60Ss when configured for light carrier operations.

READ: Arcfield Canada – CF-35s – COVER STORY

In addition to their main flight decks and aircraft hangars, future America-class amphibious assault ships will also be outfitted with traditional well decks. Such facilities are crucial as they will give operational commanders the ability to land troops ashore along with their equipment and supplies by embarked Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) or conventional Landing Craft Utility (LCU) and Amphibious Combat Vehicles (ACV), augmented by helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft. Potential load outs of these vessels can include up to 25 ACVs, 4 LCACs or 1 LCU, and dozens of other vehicles such as main battle tanks (MBTs), Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs), and logistics trucks. Overall, these ships are able to not only support amphibious assault, special operations or expeditionary warfare missions, but also serve as secondary aviation platforms for amphibious ready groups.

MISTRAL-CLASS
LANDING HELICOPTER DOCK

That said, while the America-class amphibious assault ship is a formidable platform, it is not the only option available to the RCN. France’s Mistral-class ships, also known as helicopter carriers, and referred to as “projection and command ships” since 2019, are another viable choice. With a reasonable cost of around $800 million CAD, they are capable of not only transporting and deploying 16 utility and attack helicopters from their main flight decks, but can also launch 4 LCU type landing crafts or 2 LCAC from their well decks. In terms of the Mistral-class’ force projection capacity, up to 70 vehicles including 13 MBTs and a number of IFVs and APCs, or a 40-strong tank battalion, along with 450 combat troops can be sent ashore by ship-to-shore connectors. The amphibious vessels are additionally equipped with fully outfitted 69-bed hospitals, and are capable of serving as part of a NATO Rapid Response Force or with the United Nations, making them effective hard power assets.

            In 2014 DND explored the possibility of acquiring two already constructed Mistral-class amphibious assault ships from France. These vessels had been ordered by Russia in 2010 but the delivery was stopped following the annexation of Crimea. As a result, France tried selling the ships to other nations, including Canada. However, in 2015 DND decided not to proceed with the purchase due to budget constraints. The two Mistral vessels were instead sold to the Egyptian Navy in 2015 becoming ENS Anwar El Sadat and ENS Gamal Abdel Nasser.

A POSSIBLE RETURN
TO MIDDLE POWER STATUS

Overall, the procurement of an amphibious assault ship capability is a vital part of national strategy that would allow the CAF to rapidly project and sustain strategic power at home and abroad. This joint expeditionary warfare platform would also enable the military to operate across the spectrum of conflict, strengthen interoperability with its NATO allies, and maintain an operational advantage over the threats of today and tomorrow. Furthermore, with advanced C2 systems, formidable sustainment capacity, and a large arsenal of air and maritime assets, these  naval craft could empower the CAF to independently make meaningful contributions to coalition operations and rapidly respond to humanitarian and natural disasters.

From a geopolitical perspective, such capabilities should have considerable appeal for a country like Canada that wishes to regain its middle power status on the world stage. The RCN, equipped with these vessels, would be well positioned to support joint operations ashore while still preserving its ability to defend Canada’s maritime sovereignty, particularly in the resource-rich Arctic which is fast becoming one of the most hotly-contested regions of the world. More importantly, these warships will give Ottawa the military credibility needed to exercise diplomatic muscle in meeting the challenges of the 21st century.

Richard Nghiem is a Regular CDR Contributor