For more than 60 years, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has been primarily tasked with defending against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and airspace incursions by hostile aircraft. However, due to a growing array of new offensive technologies, fielded by Russia and China, North America now faces a significantly different and more dangerous threat environment. These developments have, in recent months, caused some U.S. senators to chastise – at great length – what they called Canada’s insufficient military spending.

BY RICHARD NGHIEM

With the under resourced Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) responsible for detecting and monitoring incoming objects such hypersonic glide vehicles in the Far North and the fact that any major attack on the continent would likely pass through the Arctic, Washington has been increasingly unnerved by this notable ‘blindspot’.

While speaking during a U.S. Senate hearing in July 2023 to confirm his nomination as the next head of NORAD, Lt.-Gen. Gregory Guillot made it clear that he would have tough conversations with Ottawa about defence spending when and if he takes over the binational military organization. The hearing comes at a time of increased scrutiny in the United States over Canada’s commitment to both NATO and NORAD as a leaked document from the Pentagon, published by the Washington Post, stated that Prime Minister Justin Trudeau told allies that Ottawa “will never” spend two percent of GDP on defence. This has led to many American policymakers to refer to Canada as a “deadbeat” or “free rider” nation that relies on others for its defence and does not deserve to be either in NATO or the G7.

THE TIME IS NOW

From a Canadian perspective, whether we like it or not, it is hard to argue against these statements. If there was ever a time that Ottawa would take responsibility for its defence, fulfill its obligations to its allies, and dramatically ramp up its military spending, it would undoubtedly have to be now. With Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, China’s increasing military aggression towards its neighbours, particularly Taiwan, and increased North Korean ballistic missile tests, phrases like “a new Cold War” do not even begin to accurately describe the current global security environment. From Moscow boosting its strategic nuclear forces with new ICBMs, hypersonic glide vehicles, and SSBNs (Ballistic-Missile Submarines), and warning that it could resume nuclear tests to underscore Russian resolve in Ukraine, to China’s extraordinary nuclear buildup in a bid to develop a bonafide nuclear triad with new ICBM silo fields, bombers, and SSBNs that can match that of the United States, Canada and its allies now must contemplate a frightening future with not one, but two “near-peer” nuclear adversaries. Not only that, but Ottawa is also confronted with an increasingly volatile North Korea regime that now has the ability to credibly hit targets across most of North America including Canadian cities. All of these developments, taken together, clearly showcase that the threat to NORAD and the continent has never been higher.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD) SYSTEM

Yet, in the face of all of these dangers and challenges, Canada still refuses to meet its NORAD obligations. Yes, Canada’s previous Minister of National Defence, Anita Anand, announced that the CAF would be replacing its aging North Warning System (NWS) with the ‘Northern Approaches’ surveillance system, which would better detect and track missile threats against the continent. However, this promise did little to inspire confidence. It instead ended up reigniting the debate on Canada’s official position towards the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) shield program. To quell any further rumours, Minister Anand confirmed to reporters that Canada had not changed its policy of refusing to be a part of America’s BMD shield program, which was first declared in 2005 by the then Liberal Prime Minister, Paul Martin.

The stubborn continuation of this ill-informed policy, however, ought to be immediately reconsidered by Ottawa and reversed as the country faces real and formidable existential threats. Despite having a shared surveillance system under NORAD, Canada is not a part of the “system of system” defence against ballistic missiles. The U.S. led missile defence system is capable of defending entire countries and intercepting incoming objects ranging from ICBMs to other ballistic missiles. It consists of ground-based interceptors, anti-ballistic missiles, Aegis destroyers and cruisers, Aegis Ashore systems, X-band radars, long range discrimination radars, and hypersonic missile early warning satellites, stationed across the globe and in outer space. To sum up the status quo, it can be argued that Canada presently fulfills only half of its responsibilities to NORAD. When there is an airspace incursion, the CAF’s NWS will detect the hostile aircraft and RCAF fighter jets will be vectored to intercept them. However, when there is a missile or rocket threat, information of the incoming attack will be relayed to NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs, but the CAF will not take any defensive measures and instead will defer to the U.S. military.

This bizarre standard operating procedure is even more strange when one considers the fact that despite Ottawa’s clear acknowledgement of the proliferation of ballistic missiles around the world, the threat they pose to both NORAD and NATO, and official endorsement of BMD for deterrence and defence, the Government of Canada is still extremely reluctant to engage in bilateral talks with the U.S. on BMD architecture and the creation of interceptor algorithms, specifically designed to defend Canadian cities. But Why?

Criticism of, and the long-held taboo surrounding, BMD ultimately boils down to three main arguments: First, it’s been argued that the BMD system doesn’t work and is costly and unreliable. Second, it is highly provocative and runs the risk of triggering another nuclear arms race and the weaponization of space while degrading Canada’s traditional support for arms control and peacekeeping. And third, Canada doesn’t need protection from ballistic missiles in the first place as Ottawa’s nonaggressive, non-militaristic and relatively benign foreign policy has enabled the country to have zero adversaries. All of these assertions, however, contrary to popular belief, are completely false.

With regards to the notion of BMD technology being ineffective, recent data and updates provided by the congressionally monitored U.S. Missile Defence Agency (MDA) support a vastly different reality. Since its inception in 2002, the MDA has achieved an 80% hit-to-kill intercept rate across all of its programs, including BMD systems such as the Patriot PAC-3, AEGIS, THAAD, and the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system. Not a bad track record for a supposedly ‘ineffective’ system. Overall, although it is not perfect and vulnerable against large scale saturation missile attacks, current BMD is still immensely valuable as it has unquestionably proven to be more than capable of dealing with small to medium threats posed by unpredictable, rogue countries such as North Korea.

Moving on, in terms of the second aforementioned argument against Canada joining America’s BMD program, while one should indeed take all possible measures to avoid another nuclear arms race and another ‘Cold War’, Ottawa’s longstanding refusal to join the U.S. defence initiative and actively participate in continental missile defence has not made any difference. It has not contributed to growing stability around the world. Instead, we are currently witnessing a massive ballistic, hypersonic, and nuclear buildup by both Russia and China that will likely usher in a new strategic era during which Washington, Beijing, and Moscow will likely be ‘nuclear peers’. Recent risk assessments also forecast more hostile actors getting access to warheads, ballistic missiles, and weapons of mass destruction. Despite our best efforts, the genie is out of the bottle on proliferation.

CANADA AT RISK

More importantly, however, regardless of what Canadians may think, there are numerous credible and realistic scenarios in which Canada could be attacked either intentionally or unintentionally in a global conflict. Defence officials in Ottawa, for example, have acknowledged for many years that the North Korean regime poses a serious threat to Canadian national security. Since 2009, the rogue state has detonated two nuclear weapons, conducted dozens of long-range ballistic missile tests, threatened nuclear strikes against the U.S., and recently successfully launched a three-stage ICBM with an estimated range of 10,000 km. While many would argue that Pyongyang, in an armed conflict, would only target the West Coast of the U.S., not Canada, its weapons are not guaranteed to be highly accurate in hitting their intended targets. This consequently raises the ultimate question: What would happen if a North Korean missile, aimed at Los Angeles or Seattle, accidentally wound-up heading towards Vancouver instead? We can’t be 100% certain that Canada is completely invulnerable. Also, in such a scenario, what could the CAF do? The answer as of right now is nothing. While Ottawa currently shares early warning and attack assessment information with the U.S. through NORAD and stations military personnel at Colorado Springs, as previously mentioned it has stubbornly refused to support the BMD program.

This long held position, however, has not only weakened Canada’s position within the NORAD partnership, but more importantly, has severely undermined Canadian sovereignty and national security. Our government officials all too often forget that when it comes time to make the critical interceptor launch decisions to defend against incoming missiles, our military personnel and leaders have no voice or input in the decision-making process. They literally have to leave the room. Consequently, the algorithms that U.S. Northern Command currently employs to protect the continent do not include major Canadian cities like Toronto, Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton or Montreal.

This defence arrangement, as currently constructed, in no way serves the national interest of Canada. Wouldn’t Ottawa want to have a say in the development of the North American BMD architecture in advance of an actual ICBM/nuclear threat, especially when the potential target is a Canadian city? It is in Ottawa’s best interest to join America’s BMD shield program, as it would not only potentially save the lives of many Canadians, but also enhance the security of North America at large, completely fulfilling Canada’s obligations to NORAD.

NEW THREATS

While the uptick in countries posing a national security risk to Canada is indeed alarming, the rapid proliferation of new types of aerial threats is what is truly frightening. From modern stealthy, radar evading cruise missiles to the deployment of hypersonic glide vehicles, these new offensive technologies present a clear and significant problem for the CAF. Hypersonic glide vehicles should be of the utmost concern as they are extremely hard to detect and counter due to their overwhelming speed and unpredictable trajectory. Not only that, but they have also already been used in combat in the ongoing war in Ukraine, to devastating effect, in many cases. Consequently, it is critical that the CAF extend its radar coverage far beyond the detection range of what is currently available through the NWS. This will enable NORAD to have the necessary time to react to any incoming attack.

Overall, taking all of these factors into account, Canada’s continued refusal to accept America’s invitation to join its BMD shield program and fully fulfill its responsibilities to NORAD is completely unacceptable and needs to be rectified as soon as possible. Such a policy change is by no means controversial or unprecedented as the rest of NATO along with Australia, Japan and South Korea have already signed onto missile defence.

NORTH WARNING SYSTEM

While this proposed shift in defence posture is indisputably essential for national security, the rapid procurement and acquisition of missile defence-related equipment is just as equally important. For decades, the Canadian military has been plagued with massive cost overruns and constant delays with all of its major planned projects. Nowhere is this more evident than Ottawa’s decades long attempt to renew its nearly obsolete North Warning System (NWS), a long extensive chain of unmanned radar stations in the Arctic that provides sustained aerial surveillance of the northernmost approaches to North America.

In an effort to modernize and further expand this network to help improve NORAD, in March 2023, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that two new Over the Horizon Radar (OTHR) stations will be installed on Canadian soil to keep track of low-flying threats such as stealthy long range cruise missiles and new hypersonic glide vehicles. These future systems are the Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar and the Polar Over-the-Horizon radar. The former project will see one installation positioned in southern Ontario and ready for operations by 2028 to provide surveillance coverage of the Arctic. Simultaneously, the latter system, based somewhere in the Far North, will provide additional early warning detection and tracking capability covering the northernmost approaches to North America, including the entire Canadian Arctic Archipelago, and beyond. Both stations will be augmented by additional classified sensors placed in select locations throughout the North. Ultimately, these new facilities are extremely vital for the CAF as they will enable it to effectively monitor aircraft and high-speed missiles coming from Russia and China at far greater ranges than regular radar technology, which is limited by the curvature of the Earth. By bouncing shortwave signals off the ionosphere, they can extend Canada’s surveillance, detection, and early warning range to more than 5,000 kilometres, or in other words, permit NORAD to detect and track airborne targets from the Canada – U.S. border to the Arctic circle.

READ: DEFENCE COMMENTARY – Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR) – Raytheon Canada

This significant interest in new OTHRs is also due to the fact that U.S. and Canadian military officials have realized that other surveillance systems, such as early warning satellites, have become increasingly vulnerable to ASAT (Anti-satellite) weapons. These include both kinetic and non-kinetic threats ranging from anti-satellite missiles to electronic jamming and cyberattacks to land based lasers. Consequently, in the potential scenario of an adversarial ‘first strike’ in space to knock out U.S. and CAF space assets, it is imperative that NORAD retains another alternate early warning technology to maintain situational awareness and a clear picture of an incoming attack.

While the recent financial commitment of $4.9 billion over the next 6 years by is a good start for the modernization of NORAD, it is by no means a ‘silver bullet’. Additional defence spending, no matter how significant, is only impactful if new, highly advanced military equipment is actually fielded and made operational in a timely manner. Currently, the CAF is inept at doing both. This issue is quite clear given the fact that the only project timeline that is on schedule is the one for the first OTHR radar site in Ontario, which is now expected to begin operating by 2028. The second Arctic Polar station is not expected to be operational until 2032. With such a significant delay in procurement and actual deployment, the CAF will continue to have more of a trip wire system rather than a layering of early warning systems and will lack the necessary in-depth detection needed to reliably track incoming hypersonic glide vehicles for at least the next 10 years.

Given this stark strategic reality, Ottawa must acquire its new OTHRs on a far more accelerated spending timetable and quickly replace current NWS radar stations with more modern AN/MPQ-504 Medium Range Radars and Long-Range Discrimination Radars (LRDRs). Such a proposal is arguably the best course of action as the military has already been operating 10 AN/MPQ-504 Medium Range radars since late 2020 and therefore should not have any problems integrating more of these new systems into its NWS. More importantly, this Israeli-designed equipment has been proven in combat to be highly capable of detecting, processing, and tracking all types of threats including both low radar cross-section aircraft and ballistic missiles and providing fire control guidance for missile interceptors to complete the ‘kill chain’. With regards to the procurement of LRDRs, this choice would also greatly enhance the CAF’s situational awareness, overall picture of the Nation’s airspace, and its interoperability with the U.S. military in the context of NORAD continental defence.

These land based radars, however, can not be DND’s only focus if Canada is to effectively safeguard itself against new threats such as hypersonic missiles. It will need a much larger and comprehensive information and detection network. Such a defence structure, as part of NORAD, would require additional surveillance and communication assets such as Airborne Early Warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, aerial and maritime autonomous unmanned platforms, acoustic sensors, autonomous gliders, improved signals intelligence facilities, and new satellite constellations.

In order to address all of these needs, multiple large-scale investments must be made by all branches of the military.

RCAF

The RCAF, first and foremost, needs to acquire 8-10 AEW&C aircraft, such as the E-7 WedgeTail, and three squadrons of semi-autonomous MQ-9B SkyGuardian drones. (Luckily, Canada recently signed a contract to purchase a fleet of MQ-9B SkyGuardian Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems from General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.) These procurement projects should be considered essential given the sheer size of Canada’s airspace. It is impossible for stationary ground-based radars to singlehandedly monitor all of it. However, AEW&C aircraft can help provide additional aerial surveillance nodes and ensure that there are no “gaps” in NORAD’s air defences.

READ: UNCREWED SYSTEMS – MQ-9B for Canada

Equipped with a Multi-role Electronically Scanned Array (MESA) radar, capable of simultaneously detecting hundreds of air and sea threats within 600 km, and possessing a maximum range of over 6,500 km, the E-7 WedgeTail would not only greatly augment Canada’s real time situational awareness, but also multiply the CAF’s overall combat power. For example, in the event of an airspace incursion by Russian strategic bombers or fighters, E-7 WedgeTails, using their powerful airborne radars, would be able to provide Canadian fighter jets the necessary targeting data required to take the first shot at significant ranges. This capability is critical as modern day aerial combat revolves around beyond visual range missile engagements, where the duelling pilot who sees the adversary first has an overwhelming advantage. Besides defending against hostile aircraft, E-7 WedgeTails can also detect and track hundreds of low flying, radar evading cruise missiles heading for major Canadian and American population centres, vector fighters to intercept them, and confirm NORAD’s overall air picture while remaining constantly mobile and less vulnerable to enemy attack than stationary land-based radar systems.

These aerial platforms, however, can be made even more effective by teaming them with small contingents of long range MQ-9B SkyGuardian UAVs that are designed to fly for 40+ hours in all types of weather, day or night, and are outfitted with new revolutionary electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors built by L3Harris in Canada. Overall, with the acquisition and deployment of the aforementioned assets, the RCAF will greatly improve its ability to defend the continent.

READ: UNCREWED SYSTEMS REPORT

RCN

While detecting and tracking air threats is the main responsibility of the air force, the RCN can also undertake this role and contribute to year-round underwater and under-ice intelligence gathering for NORAD in the Arctic. It can do this by deploying its frigates to the Far North more frequently to supplement ground-based radars and by constructing an extensive maritime network of seabed Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) acoustic sensors, autonomous underwater gliders, and sonar array-equipped Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs), to monitor Russian submarine activity in the region. These undersea surveillance assets, which can be deployed from the RCN’s new Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS), will help the CAF detect Russian SSBNs and SSGNs (Cruise-Missile Submarines) more effectively and hunt them down with Canada’s newly purchased P-8 Poseidon ASW aircraft. With such a capability, NORAD would not only gain a more accurate tactical picture of where SLBMs (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles) could possibly be fired from, but also be able to potentially pre-empt the launch of hypersonic or nuclear missiles via ASW efforts.

SPACE

Last, but not least, in terms of improvements to its aerial surveillance capabilities, DND must expedite its efforts to replace its aging RADARSAT Constellation. According to a report from the Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAG) last year, this vital satellite network is likely to outrun its useful lifespan by 2026 with its current planned replacement, the Defence Enhanced Surveillance from Space Project (DESSP), not likely to be operational until 2035. This future long term capability gap, if not properly addressed right now, will unquestionably present a significant national security problem for Canada. With the rapid development of modernized weapons, satellites are more essential than ever for monitoring the northern, maritime, and aerospace approaches to North America. These space systems not only provide the CAF sufficient early warning against all aerial attacks, but also enable the passage of real-time information to present options to civilian and military decision makers. 

Such capabilities, however, are only possible due to advanced camera lenses, sensors, command and control tools and communications infrastructure. As a result, all possible efforts must be made to quickly modernize these pieces of equipment and ensure effective interoperability between DND’s future DESSP and the Pentagon’s new “Next-Gen Polar” satellite constellation over the Arctic. The construction of Canada’s Enhanced Satellite Communication Project – Polar (ESCP-P), also needs to be accelerated immediately as this separate space system is charged with providing reliable and secure narrowband and wide-band communications access across the Far North. Without the efficient relaying of collected data and information regarding potential air threats to CAF C2 nodes, Ottawa’s new OTHRs, no matter how advanced, will be rendered operationally irrelevant.

CFB ALERT

Nonetheless, while enhanced aerial detection, surveillance and pre-emption capabilities are critical to modernizing NORAD and safeguarding Canada, credible continental defence also entails robust intelligence gathering expertise. It is therefore imperative that Ottawa ensures that the military continues to maintain its world-class signals intelligence capabilities at Canadian Forces Station (CFS) Alert. The station is located on Ellesmere Island in the territory of Nunavut, 817 km from the North Pole, and is Canada’s northernmost base. Given its strategic location and relative proximity to Russia, it has, for decades, allowed the Five Eyes alliance to eavesdrop on Russia’s communications network in the Far North. The value of such a capability cannot be understated as it could give NORAD early warning of an impending nuclear attack on either Canada or the U.S. before Russian ICBMs even leave their silos. The CAF, however, in the past decade, have largely neglected the maintenance of CFS Alert, despite it being one of Nation’s most important intelligence assets. This situation must be immediately rectified with increased infrastructure funding and new procurement projects to upgrade the station’s data communications, radio intercept, electric generator, airfield operations, and engineering equipment. With these improvements, CFS Alert will not only be more privy to Russian military communications and deployments, but also more efficient in relaying real time data directly to intelligence experts working at CFS Leitrim, just outside Ottawa via satellite link.

Overall, by executing all of the recommendations mentioned in this article, Canada will greatly boost NORAD’s early warning capacity as well as its situational awareness in multiple domains.

CLOSING THE KILL-CHAIN

Continental defence, however, if it is to be a credible deterrent, demands more than just that. It also requires the kinetic means to respond appropriately to an incoming attack or in other words, complete the ‘kill chain’. Investments must be made to acquire new forward operating bases, air-to-air refuelling tankers, along with ground and sea-based hit-to-kill interceptors.

DND, to their credit, has acknowledged some of these needs and prioritized the procurement of new infrastructure and Airbus A330 refuelling tankers to accommodate the RCAF’s new F-35s, with $38.6 billion in funding over the next 20 years. However, despite this financial commitment, the actual construction and acquisition of these facilities and aircraft respectively is taking far too long. Upgrades to the air force’s two main fighter jet bases, CFB Cold Lake and CFB Bagotville, and the modernization of the branch’s refuelling tanker squadrons are not expected to take place until 2029, while runway improvements at the RCAF’s current Forward Operating Locations (FOL) at Yellowknife and Inuvik, Northwest Territories, Iqaluit, Nunavut, and Goose Bay, Labrador will likely not be completed for another 11 years. Not only that, but these northern bases also still have basic shelter and support facilities geared to the CF-188 Hornet, rather than the F-35.

It is imperative that significant additional funding is granted for the construction of Arctic airfield infrastructure to expedite their completion. These measures, if carried out, will not only enhance NORAD’s ability to patrol the northernmost edges of North America, but also signal Canada’s unwavering resolve when it comes to its Arctic sovereignty.

However, while these actions will help the CAF better intercept conventional airspace violations, they do not address the most pressing problem facing NORAD: Ottawa’s longstanding refusal to join America’s BMD shield program and field anti-ballistic missile interceptors. As stated earlier in this article, Canadians must acknowledge the current dire state of the global security environment and accept the hard reality that the world is already in another Cold War. Canada therefore must equip the CAF with the latest state-of-the-art ground and sea-based hit-to-kill interceptors.

This effort should include the immediate procurement of several Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD batteries as well as 3-4 Aegis Ashore systems. Such acquisitions collectively would enable Canada to have a robust, diverse, multi-tiered, multi-role, layered air defence network. And at the centre of that network would be the Aegis Ashore system. While many defence experts may argue that such installations are far too expensive for Canada and not even combat proven, one should first look at its capabilities, main mission set, and determine if there is any other air defence kit that can outperform it at a lower price. The answer to the last question is a resounding no.

To conclude, broadly speaking, recent efforts by DND regarding NORAD modernization, including the procurement of new OTHRs along with support infrastructure for the RCAF’s F-35s have all been steps in the right direction. These projects, collectively, however, are not being completed fast enough to keep up with the rapid proliferation of new aerial threats. DND, in response, must start taking its NORAD modernization efforts more seriously with additional funding and accelerated spending timetables. Ottawa also needs to countermand its longstanding anti-missile defence policy and instead closely work with the U.S. Missile Defence Agency to guarantee the safety and security of North America.

Richard Nghiem is a Regular CDR Contributor