Arctic Quick Reaction Force – Adding ‘Teeth’ to Canada’s 2024 Arctic Foreign Policy

The Arctic is experiencing a major transformation. The acceleration of climate change, a shifting geopolitical landscape and evolving security threats are impacting the Arctic in unique ways and highlights the need for strong Canadian leadership to assert Canada’s territorial claims within the region. With this in mind, CDR asked its Writer, Richard Nghiem, to explore the concept of creating an Arctic Quick Reaction Force (QRF). Composed of highly mobile and flexible units that specialize in cold-weather warfare, mountaineering and surveillance, a QRF would clearly showcase Ottawa’s unwavering political resolve to both Moscow and Beijing with regards to its national sovereignty. Here is our report.

BY RICHARD NGHIEM

For over 30 years since the end of the Cold War, Canada and its allies managed to preserve the Arctic as a zone of low tension that was free from military competition. This approach allowed for significant benefits, uniting the Arctic nations to strengthen cooperation on various issues of common interest, such as sustainable development, environmental protection, climate change, and scientific collaboration, through the Arctic Council which was established in Ottawa.

However, in recent years, the guardrails that Canada has come to depend on to prevent and resolve conflict in the region have weakened. Russia’s illegal, unprovoked war in Ukraine has made diplomatic cooperation on Arctic issues exceedingly difficult for the foreseeable future while threats to Canadian security are no longer bound by geography as climate change is accelerating rapidly, opening northern economic transit routes earlier than expected and emboldening the Russian Navy to deploy more submarines and warships inside Canadian territorial waters. Furthermore, non-Arctic states, including China, are also seeking greater influence in the region through the presence of surveillance ships, ‘research’ vessels, and nuclear icebreakers.

To counter these moves made by its adversaries, Canada must first improve its diplomatic posture and ties with its 5 Nordic allies, which are now all NATO members, as well as its military-to-military relationship with its greatest and strongest ally, the United States. More importantly, though, Ottawa must take into account the evolving security and political dynamics of the Arctic and adopt a new, recalibrated geopolitical approach to promote Canada’s national interests in the region. Such a long term strategic plan would need to prioritize the Nation’s sovereignty in the Far North, advance its national security interests, and emphasize the importance of resource extraction along with economic prosperity. Overall, while Canada’s new 2024 Arctic Foreign Policy is primarily a diplomatic strategy, on paper, it is imperative that the policy, when actually implemented, is more muscular in nature and incorporates realpolitik reasoning and hard power when necessary.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

CAF’S LIMITED ARCTIC
WAR-FIGHTING CAPABILITIES

With that being said, although Canada is universally viewed as an Arctic state with 40 percent of its landmass located in the Far North and 75 percent of its coastline on the Arctic Ocean, it has long been challenged on how to effectively exert sovereignty and maintain security over such a vast amount of territory.The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), if called upon to militarily defend the Nation’s northern regions today, would not even be remotely capable of mobilizing sufficient troops and equipment, never mind carrying out highly demanding and extremely sophisticated Arctic combat operations.

To substantiate this claim, in terms of current war fighting capacity, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) has a meagre fleet of 12 frigates, 4 submarines, and 6 AOPSs. While these ships and undersea assets have a somewhat respectable capability to enforce sovereignty and security through their presence and weapons platforms, this only applies when these assets are actually deployed to the Arctic, which is primarily only during the summer months. This operational capability gap is a direct result of Canada’s northern Nanisivik Naval Facility being in a poor state of repair and ill-equipped to operate in cold weather conditions. With regards to the air domain, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) maintains a decent force structure of 15 CP-140 Aurora maritime-patrol aircraft and 92 CF-18 fighter jets, located in south-east and central Canada, for air interceptions, sovereignty operations, and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) missions as part of its North American Air Defence (NORAD) and continental defence duties. CC-130s, CC-177s, and CH-147 Chinooks are also sometimes used to deliver troops and supplies to the Arctic to sustain Canada’s presence in the region. Having said that, these aircraft are based too far south to be able to effectively conduct patrols, monitor the Nation’s key air and maritime approaches, and swiftly respond to incursions by Russian strategic bombers and guided missile submarines into Canada’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) and territorial waters. This capability shortfall is due to the fact that with long flight times to designated patrol areas and limited time on station, current air defence and maritime patrol coverage is fairly minimal in scope and duration.

Lastly, on land, there are currently only 500 Regular Force soldiers and 1,800 Rangers that are stationed North of the 60th parallel, leaving a great deal of the country without a ground force presence. To make matters worse, basic, fundamental tactical movement has been identified as one of the Army’s most serious liabilities as during recent exercises, serious deficiencies were discovered in the ability of Canadian troops to move a formed element. This capability gap is due to a shortage of light over-snow vehicles. Sustaining deployed forces has additionally been found to be equally problematic with equipment failure being more frequent and harder to work around in the Arctic due to logistical constraints. These shortcomings pose a significant strategic problem for Ottawa as for Arctic security to be viable, the Department of National Defence (DND) must have a credible reaction force, capable of responding to all spectrums of conflict across all domains. And as of right now, such a combat unit does not exist within the CAF. Be that as it may, given the fact that most of the Arctic consists of swathes of unoccupied tundra, a large, dispersed defence force tasked with simply occupying terrain is not necessarily needed. Highly mobile and flexible Arctic Quick Reaction Force (QRF) units, instead, should be formed and primarily specialize in cold-weather warfare, mountaineering, surveillance, and forcible entry parachute assaults.

REPAIRING THE CAF’S AGING
ARCTIC INFRASTRUCTURE

These new commissioned battalions or regiments, permanently tasked with Arctic security, however, are by no means the panacea to Canada’s sovereignty issues. If Ottawa is to credibly secure the Far North, it must also invest heavily in defence infrastructure as well as the necessary forward basing that will be needed to adequately support the CAF’s new Arctic QRFs. Having said that, while all three of these focus areas are critical for any future defence strategy regarding the Far North, infrastructure, first and foremost, must be prioritized. Without logistics hubs, ISR and early warning assets, and Quick Reaction Alert Facilities, any attempt at developing a new viable rapid deployment force would only result in failure as this unit would be unable to not only sustain itself and operate within the region but also respond to crises in a timely manner.

Some examples of desperately needed structural improvements currently include the modernization of the Nation’s North Warning System (NWS) and intelligence gathering facilities. With regards to the former, the military’s existing northern-based early warning radars must be replaced with modern AN/MPQ-504 Medium Range Radars and transportable long range, high-altitude active AN/TPY-2 digital antenna arrays which can detect targets 3,000 km away. Such a proposal is arguably the best course of action as the military has already been operating 10 AN/MPQ-504 Medium Range radars since late 2020 and therefore should not have any problems integrating more of these new platforms into its NWS. More importantly, both the AN/MPQ-504 and AN/TPY-2 X-band surveillance radar have been proven in combat to be highly mobile and capable of detecting, classifying and tracking all types of threats.

With that being said, intelligence gathering stations will always be unquestionably more valuable than the Nation’s current NWS to the situational awareness and operational responsiveness of any proposed Arctic rapid response force. For this reason, Ottawa must ensure that the military continues to enhance its world-class signals intelligence intercept capabilities at CFS Alert by upgrading the station’s data communications, radio intercept, electric generator, airfield operations, and construction & engineering equipment. Exploiting these improvements, CFS Alert would not only be more privy to Russian military communications and deployments – such as snap large-scale submarine exercises – but also more efficient in relaying real-time data directly to intelligence experts working at CFS Leitrim, just outside Ottawa via satellite link.

In addition to this example of SIGINT, surveillance data collection is another area of ISR that Canada needs to leverage. Sentry Multi-Domain Surveillance Towers, produced by Anduril, should be procured by DND to provide highly accurate, persistent, and autonomous situational awareness across air, land, and sea throughout the Arctic. With AI-enabled edge processing along with continuous 360 pan/tilt radars and sensors, Sentry can deliver not only fully automated detection, tracking, classification and analysis of air and maritime traffic, but also hostile aircraft or vessel detection over vast areas without any human intervention. These multi-domain surveillance platforms additionally utilize Lattice, an open software platform, to fuse data from a custom network of other Sentry Towers and legacy or third party sensors to create a comprehensive common operating picture between commanders and deployed military personnel. Overall, this expansive and robust monitoring capability is extremely beneficial given the security challenges posed by the vast geographic size of the Arctic and the CAF’s limited manpower as it would enable Ottawa to do more with less and guarantee year-round surveillance of Canadian airspace, coastlines, and maritime approaches.

While ISR and early warning infrastructure is a key focus area for reducing the reaction time for a newly stood up QRF and enhancing its operational readiness, improvements to military bases that house and maintain the actual combat assets of a rapid deployment force must also be prioritized. For example, the successful transition of Canada’s fighter force from the CF-18 to the F-35A will require significant upgrades to aging hangars, runways, maintenance facilities, and computer networks at the RCAF’s two main fighter jet bases, CFB Cold Lake and CFB Bagotville, as well as its NORAD Region Forward Operating Locations. These improvements are vital as the service must ensure that its future Quick Reaction Alert Facilities have adequate storage depots for spare parts, fuel, and munitions, sufficient housing and hangar bay infrastructure, and the most up-to-date IT backbone in place so that when the first batch of F-35As arrive, the Air Force can actually operate those jets right away.

Such preparations for the future must also apply to the maritime domain, particularly in the form of repairs and port improvements to the existing, strategically well placed Nanisivik Naval Facility in Canada’s northern territory of Nunavut. This base should be made permanently operational year-round instead of only during a four month summer time period and the homeport of the RCN’s new Northern Fleet, consisting of AOPSs, River-class destroyers, AIP attack submarines, Vigilance-class OPVs, and auxiliary Joint Support Ships. To achieve this, numerous refurbishment and dock expansion projects are needed along with other modernization efforts to retrofit the naval facility to be capable of refuelling, repairing, and rearming ships. Potential investments and upgrades include the construction of jet-capable airstrips, fuel storage systems, munitions storage warehouses, and refueling, maintenance, and housing facilities. With these structural improvements, this naval base would be fully outfitted to not only ensure 24/7/365 protection of the Arctic Archipelago and the strategic Northwest Passage, but also significantly reduce transit times of RCN ships, thereby allowing for longer times on station for sovereignty operations. Such a capability would be especially vital for Canada’s Harry DeWolf-class vessels as they can only stay at sea for up to 4 months when resupplied, either from shore or by JSSs. The RCN’s future River-class destroyers and SSKs, operating from Nanisivik Naval Facility, could also be quickly surged to monitor nearby Russian or Chinese submarines.

In drawing things to a close, infrastructure for sustaining significant numbers of Canadian ground troops in the Arctic should also be made a priority. It is imperative that operational support hubs are constructed, equipped with airstrips and helicopter pads at which CC-130 Hercules, CC-177 Globemaster, and CH-147 Chinook aircraft can land and deliver food, medical supplies, ammunition and fuel. These facilities will not only enable the CAF to rapidly move people, materiel, and equipment throughout the region, but also allow for it to respond to crises like natural disasters in a timely manner and conduct large-scale operations for sustained periods of time, if necessary. Most importantly, though, with all of these supplies stored in warehouses and fuel tanks in the Far North, both active Army and reserve units can be supported year-round to showcase Canada’s presence in the region as well as Ottawa’s unwavering political resolve to both Moscow and Beijing with regards to its territorial claims and national sovereignty.

FORWARD BASING

Building off of these infrastructure initiatives, the force posture of the Canadian military should also be revised to be more expansive and forward positioned within the Arctic Circle to improve the operational response time of the Nation’s new rapid deployment force. Such a shift in defence policy, in addition to diplomatic negotiations with Denmark and Iceland, could possibly grant Ottawa valuable access to the strategic airfield facilities and deep water port at Pituffik Space Base – formerly and perhaps better known as Thule Air Base – in Greenland, along with Reykjavík international airport in Iceland. At both of these installations, the CAF could then effectively improve existing infrastructure and expand current facilities to support the sustained forward deployment of RCN and RCAF ASW assets. These combat systems, in the future, will include multi-role River-class destroyers, AIP attack submarines, P-8A Poseidon aircraft, CH-148 Cyclone helicopters, and MQ-9B SkyGuardian UCAVs. With air and naval undersea warfare forces based at Pituffik Space Base and aerial ASW squadrons at Reykjavík international airport, the CAF would be able to immediately hold hostile submarines at risk not only around the North Pole and Northwest Passage, but also the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap which serves as a gateway to the North Atlantic. Consequently, if war were to break out in the Far North, sonobuoy-equipped RCAF MQ-9B SkyGuardians could deploy passive and active acoustic arrays in the open waters of the Arctic Ocean and GIUK gap, while P-8A Poseidon aircraft and CH-148 Cyclone helicopters – upon detection of Russian or Chinese subs – would engage these targets with MK-54 and MK-46 torpedoes respectively.

         However, while the use of foreign bases as part of a new forward defence posture is key, additional NORAD forward operating locations and Winter Warfare Centres must also be constructed in Canada’s northern territories. The former would enable shorter response times for air interceptions of Russian or Chinese strategic bombers by F-35s, more time on station for P-8A maritime patrol aircraft over the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, and greater MQ-9B ISR coverage in the region. CH-148 Cyclone helicopters, permanently stationed in the Far North, would also be able to provide year-round ASW patrols around the strategic Northwest Passage. Shifting to the Army’s perspective, new Winter Warfare Centres, in addition to the existing one at Resolute Bay in Nunavut, would be critical for Canadian sovereignty, not only to conduct cold weather warfare training for active duty soldiers and reservists, but also serve as the Army’s main forward command posts during disaster response and combat operations in the Arctic. Furthermore, these installations can allow for the forward positioning of Arctic-oriented Army battalions, CSOR detachments, and JTF2 units within the region to reduce logistics challenges and improve the ability of the CAF to conduct SAR missions, disaster relief operations, presence patrols, and if necessary, tactical defensive combat operations against a foreign military incursion.

         Such battalions, best suited to be tasked with all of these responsibilities in the Far North, would be the light infantry battalions within each of Canada’s existing Mechanized Brigade Groups (MBGs). Soldiers in these units have not only already undergone parachuting and mountain operations training to ensure their maneuverability in the Arctic, but have also been drilled in how to close with and destroy hostile forces through a variety of insertion methods. Moreover, they are accustomed to operating in austere environments with only periodic sustainment. As a result, light infantry battalions from various MBGs must be forward deployed on a rotational basis to Winter Warfare Centres throughout the country’s northern territories to both strengthen deterrence against Moscow and Beijing and clearly showcase Canada’s presence in the region.

RCN ARCTIC QRF

These changes in force posture and infrastructure, however, are by no means, flawless. As a result, it is imperative that Ottawa has strategic reserve forces such as a naval QRF at its disposal to rapidly respond to any incursion into its territorial waters by foreign warships or submarines that somehow evaded its forward defences. Such a fleet would undoubtedly require well-armed patrol ships, capable of not only neutralizing hostile Russian or Chinese warships and submarines and ensuring safe navigation through thick ice covered waters. To meet this demand, the Navy’s Harry DeWolf-class Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships, despite being just recently commissioned,should be immediately upgraded to include a new combat system, Naval Strike Missile (NSM) launchers, a SeaRAM or Phalanx Close-in Weapon System, a 5-inch Mk 45 main gun, several Mk 70 Payload Delivery Systems, and a full undersea warfare suite of towed sonar arrays, autonomous maritime drones, and deployable acoustic sensors and gliders that can detect submarines from thousands of kilometres away.

The last two aforementioned pieces of defence equipment, the Mk 70 PDS and multi-faceted ASW suite, are particularly of the utmost importance. Capable of supporting SM-6 and Tomahawk cruise missiles, which could strike land and maritime targets out to 450 and 1600 km away, the former would give Canada’s AOPSs a formidable strike capability while the latter set of technologies would enable the Navy’s AOPS to feed real-time information to their CH-148 Cyclone helicopters or the RCAF’s P-8As to help them track down and destroy enemy submarines at stand-off distances.

In addition to up-gunned, updated AOPSs, the RCN’s Arctic QRF should also consist of newly acquired Multi-Purpose Support Ships (MPSS) / drone carriers that can deploy, operate, and recover numerous uncrewed combat systems at a high tempo. These ships, built by Damen Shipyards Group, have multifunctional capabilities and have been designed with further adaptability in mind to serve a broad spectrum of missions, such as drone management for ISR and offensive strike operations, amphibious support, disaster relief, search and rescue operations, diving and undersea rescue missions, and ASW operations. This combat potential is a tremendous asset for the RCN to have. Given the vast geographic size of the Arctic and the service’s limited manpower, AI-enabled UAVs, UUVs, and USVs may soon be relied upon to be the most cost-effective platforms for conducting day-to-day operations in the Far North. With the capability to stay in the air and on or under the surface of the country’s oceans longer than most of the military’s planes, ships, and submarines, autonomous unmanned systems are arguably far more proficient at providing year-round surveillance and ensuring control of the entirety of Canadian airspace, coastlines, and maritime approaches.

More importantly, if armed conflict were to break out with Russia or China over a military incursion into sovereign Canadian territory, these platforms would also undoubtedly be on the frontlines. MPSS-launched Mojave STOL drones could transport contested logistic pods capable of carrying 500 pounds of cargo on each wing to support land or maritime missions and allow Canadian ground forces adequate time to mobilize, deploy, and set up necessary expeditionary advanced bases throughout the Arctic.

Finally, to round out the RCN’s new Arctic rapid response force, existing Coast Guard icebreakers would need to be integrated into the CAF to provide additional icebreaking capacity and be repurposed as new mission relay platforms, satellite uplink/download stations, and mobile staging sites. Taken altogether, these partially converted icebreakers, new Multi-Purpose Support Ships / drone carriers, and revamped AOPSs would form the heart of Ottawa’s new naval squadron and more importantly assert Canadian sovereignty and power in the Far North.

ARCTIC AIRBORNE QRF

A naval QRF is far from the only rapid deployment formation that the military would need to effectively augment its enhanced forward presence in the Arctic. From a Joint Air Operations and land domain perspective, the Canadian Army must also play a role and reinstate its Airborne Regiment to reacquire its ability to rapidly respond to crises, surge combat forces forward across a wide range of challenging environments, such as Arctic tundra, and conduct large-scale forcible entry parachute assaults against remote targets in austere areas to quickly seize and defend vital territory for follow-on military operations. These include close air support sorties and HIMARS fire missions which can be conducted to facilitate sea denial and sea control in Canada’s vast Arctic Archipelago.

Acknowledging such vital combat capabilities that would be made available with the standing up of an Arctic Air Expeditionary Force, numerous structural changes within the Canadian Army would likely need to be undertaken. Existing airborne companies which operate independently of one another – and do not collectively train, nor deploy on either exercises or operations – would need to be unified and consolidated in an effort to increase combat cohesion, generate war fighting capacity, and effectively centralize C2 into one singular entity or QRF. This merging of units would also need to include small contingents from each of Canada’s aforementioned MBGs’ light battalions which already maintain troops, trained in parachuting and mountain operations. To further supplement this internal restructuring of the Army, additional investments in the parachuting community at Petawawa could also be allocated to ensure that these airborne troops and future parachuters will be fully capable of conducting SAR, disaster relief, presence patrols, and tactical combat operations in the Arctic. Lastly, in terms of logistics and basing, this newly created QRF could be stationed near any existing rotary or fixed wing airlift squadron bases to be able to be quickly deployable anywhere within the Arctic via aerial insertion. They could also be situated at newly constructed Winter Warfare Centres throughout Canada’s northern territories and operate from these forward command posts as they offer unmatched rapid response capability and are well suited for coordinating disaster response and combat operations in the Far North.

It is also imperative that the Army supports its new Arctic Airborne QRF with all the necessary combat equipment that it would need including long range fires systems, mobile air defence platforms, all-terrain combat vehicles, and cold weather-capable long-range assault aircraft. For fire support and sea denial missions, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems and Autonomous Multi-domain Launchers, equipped with extended-range Precision Strike Missiles which have a maximum range of at least 1,000 km, must be purchased. In a potential conflict in the Far North, such units and weapons platforms would be critical as their rapid deployment to remote islands in the Arctic Archipelago via CC-130s or CC-177s would enable the Canadian Army, assisted by the RCAF’s new MQ-9B SkyGuardians, to effectively deliver long-range precision fires against Russian or Chinese warships. In this way, small mobile detachments of airborne troops, despite their limited force size, could sustain effective A2/AD networks or zones and be able to credibly defend Canadian territory, coastal areas, and sea lines of communication.

However, this proposed new Arctic Airborne QRF would, by no means, be only responsible for maritime defence and dealing with limited ground incursions. It would also be assigned with air defence duties and tasked with augmenting NORAD’s detection and interception capabilities. From an equipment acquisition perspective, a prime air transportable and air droppable platform for this mission set is Rafael’s All-in-One (AiO) short- to medium-range ground-based air defence system which is deployed on a single 8×8 vehicle. The system accommodates dual cabin C2 workstations, a 360⁰ phased array radar along with day/night EO/IR Sensors, a launcher for up to eight I-Derby SR/ER or PYTHON-5 SR canisterized missiles, and a robust power supply. This provides an agile, autonomous defence against a multitude of aerial threats. Deploying within minutes in challenging terrains, like the Arctic, with short reaction times and minimized logistics footprint, the system can also be seamlessly integrated with an independent full-scale SPYDER battery of other All-in-One systems in a joint mission, enhancing operational flexibility.

Having said that, while the aforementioned weapons platforms are all unquestionably effective at monitoring and securing the Nation’s air and maritime approaches, a robust and very visible ground presence is still needed to reinforce Canada’s presence in the Arctic. To achieve this, all-terrain armoured BvS10s from BAE Systems, which are capable of rapidly traversing snow-covered mountainous Arctic territory that would hinder most vehicles, must be procured. Built with protection against anti-tank mines and the capability to be air transportable by aircraft like Canada’s CH-147 Chinooks, CC-130 Hercules, and CC-177s, these platforms are also designed to be able to integrate with a wide-range of weaponry and specialized equipment, while maintaining additional flexibility to be equipped for future mission needs. As a result, with numerous variants, these vehicles can support Canadian airborne troops in both a logistic and combat capacity, serving as ambulances, mobile C2 centres, mortar platforms, armoured personnel carriers, remote weapon stations, counter battery radars, anti-tank missile platforms, loitering munition launch vehicles, and repair and recovery assets. More importantly, though, these combat systems in the Far North would be able to serve as yet another credible deterrent force.

IMPROVEMENTS TO AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES

Lastly, while new combat platforms are undoubtedly one of the main priorities for the creation of a new QRF, the CAF will also need to upgrade and expand their airlift fleet to support such a unit and acquire the speed and airlift capacity needed to assert Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic. In order to be able to help transport more ground forces up North, the RCAF needs to replace its aging CH-146 utility helicopters with new, larger, and more versatile V-280 Valor multi-mission tilt-rotor aircraft, which can transport far more troops and equipment and be used for logistical support and special operation missions. With over twice the speed and range of current turboprop aircraft and advanced agility greater than a traditional helicopter, the V-280 is the only proven long-range assault solution capable of fulfilling multi-domain combat operations as well as other missions including MEDEVAC, utility tasks, and disaster relief. It is additionally equipped with unparalleled mission sensors which allow pilots to operate in challenging visual environments and provide troops onboard with as much situational awareness and intelligence as possible while enroute to and at the objective.

Furthermore, additional snow-ski equipped Chinook heavy-lift helicopters, CC-177 Globe Master, and CC-130 Hercules aircraft should be procured to bolster the CAF’s ability to haul significant amounts of combat equipment and supplies over long distances in harsh weather to the Far North. Last, but not least, to support and extend the range of all the aforementioned logistics assets, DND should purchase 5 KC-46 Pegasus refuelling tankers to complement its two current fully dedicated Airbus CC-150 Polaris tankers, 4 CC-130 Hercules tankers, and 7 soon-to-be acquired CC-330 Husky aircraft.

Altogether, Ottawa must come to terms with the fact that with rising threats from China and Russia surrounding the opening of economic transit routes and resource extraction, a new Cold War in the Arctic may be inevitable. Russia has been flexing its military muscle in the Arctic like never before, using dozens of nuclear submarines and nuclear-powered icebreakers, and even laying claims to territory within 200 nautical miles from Canada’s coastline. As a result, Ottawa must take all possible measures to boost its defence capabilities and capacity to preserve its territorial integrity and national interests in the Arctic. More importantly, it must prioritize investments in defence infrastructure, forward basing, and the creation of QRF units as these proposed initiatives are the best ways to project Canadian presence in the Arctic, deter any potential conflict with Russia or China, and safeguard the Nation’s territorial sovereignty along with its northern interests.

Richard Nghiem is a Regular CDR Contributor