BY ALLAN MCDOUGALL
This Op-Ed is the first in a three-part series examining how to address critical supply chain challenges that directly impact the Canadian Armed Forces’ operational effectiveness and national security interests.
As we work to improve the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF’s) readiness and operational support models, we will inevitably face challenges. As it stands today, our current operational readiness is far from ideal. According to a CBC report by Murray Brewster, approximately 54% of our naval assets, 55% of our air force assets, and 46% of our army assets are classified as “not serviceable.” Given the relatively modest size of the CAF, this represents more than just “having some work to do” – it signals a capability gap.
3 CORE READINESS QUESTIONS
When assessing readiness, we can reduce this concept into three fundamental basic questions: 1) Do we have the forces necessary to meet our operational objectives? 2) Do we have the resources and processes necessary to sustain those forces as they work to meet our objectives? 3) Can we generate new forces to replace those that are either lost or degraded in meeting those objectives?
The military exists to defend Canada’s sovereignty against external armed threats and to project Canada’s interests abroad. At its core, it is there to defend and protect Canadian territory to ensure our nation remains both secure and sovereign. Achieving this mission requires clearly defined operational goals and the ability to fill those roles with capable personnel through selection, training, equipping, supplying, and maintaining their capability to do their jobs.
Therein, our focus is on equipping, supplying, and maintaining the solider, sailor, or aircrew with the tools they need to succeed. This effort depends on two key elements: the supply chain, and the supply chain management structure.
The supply chain encompasses the complex network of entities that come together to take raw materials and turn it into a useful finished product.
In contrast, supply chain management, consists of the “forecasting and demand planning, sourcing, and procurement of things.” (ASCM, n.d.) These two elements are interdependent and must operate together to be effective.
We can describe the mission of the supply chain as follows:
The production of useful products or delivery of useful services so that that they arrive on time, in acceptable condition, at the right location, for a reasonable cost.
The conflict in Ukraine provides valuable lessons in supply chain management. One publicly discussed example is the shortage of 155mm artillery shells. Artillery is reported to have caused approximately 80% of the casualties on both sides of the conflict. The claim is based on the study by Grey et al. (2024), which specifically cites the Russo-Ukraine War and underscores the strategic importance of supply chain management.
Despite this importance, some Ukrainian commanders described conditions where these shells were in critically short, supply on the front lines.
This challenge from both stems from supply chain and supply chain management failures. On the supply chain side, Western countries lack the production capacity to keep up with the conflict’s high rate of artillery usage. Even today, many countries remain unable to produce adequate quantities of this kind of ammunition for their own artillery forces.
On the supply chain management side, those involved in determining the need for the shells underestimated the need for the shells, how quickly stockpiles would be depleted, and their battlefield significance.
SUPPLY CHAIN &
SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT
The 155mm artillery shell serves as a canary in the coal mine because it has revealed deeper vulnerabilities. When we revisit our three core readiness questions through the lens of supply chain and supply chain management, the following must be questioned: 1) Can we obtain the assets necessary to sustain our forces? 2) Do we have resilient supply chain management in place to maintain that capability, especially under strain or disruption? 3) Do we have the processes in place to replace any existing element of the supply chain quickly? 4) Do we have any insight into any critical steps in the supply chain that warrant additional preparation in case of disruption?
As Canada undertakes work like the Joint Logistics Modernization (National Defence, 2022) and looks to further reinforce the capacity domains (Command, Sense, Act, Shield, Sustain, and Generate), these kinds of questions must be closer to front of mind than afterthoughts. Beyond simply increasing the warfighting tools (also critically important), establishing and exercising the process by which the CAF looks at its mission priorities, links those priorities to its capabilities, and critically examines its supply chain from a mission-centric perspective (not a nation-building viewpoint) needs to be part of the hard work of rebuilding our CAF.
Allan McDougall is a Cyber Security Expert at ADGA Group. The views expressed here are his own and do not necessarily reflect a CDR editorial position.
